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This dissertation explores the important contributions that unofficial negotiation processes 
can and do make to conflict resolution and political transitions. The theories regarding 
unofficial negotiations are explored in the context of a South African case study and will look 
at the ways in which the efforts made by members of the private sector during the last five 
years of apartheid, from September 1985 to February 1990, contributed to the start of official 
negotiations and a peace agreement, ending decades of racial prejudice and violence. What is 
so interesting about the South African case study is not only the success of the unofficial 
negotiation processes, but the specific roles played by members of big business, both as 
participants and as third-party mediators. The private sector in South Africa for decades had a 
complicated relationship with the government, causing severe animosity among the poorest 
members of the population who resented capitalist greed while they suffered racial 
oppression and poverty. In this dissertation, details of how two of the most powerful mining 
companies intervened against apartheid and facilitated important track-two diplomacy, as 
well as their motivations and the consequences of their actions will be presented and 
discussed. The South African case is a testament to the importance of back-channel 
negotiations as well as the positive contributions that the private sector can make to conflict 
resolution. More importantly, it takes a unique focus on the motivations of the private sector 
role players and identifies the ways in which the historical context and interests of the private 
sector affected their involvement in track-two diplomacy, and the outcomes of these 
proceedings.  
This thesis will therefore begin with a thorough examination of the major literature regarding 
the unofficial negotiations conducted by mining companies between 1985 and 1990, as well 
as the theories which will be used to conduct this theory case study, including 
prenegotiations, track-two diplomacy and the role of third party intervention.  The South 
African case study has been divided into two phases, firstly the meeting which took place 
between the African National Congress (ANC) and executives from the Anglo American 
Corporation (Anglo) in September 1985 and secondly, the series of talks in Mells Park, 
England from 1987 to 1990, attended by members of the ANC and South African academics 
and facilitated by Consolidated Gold Fields (Gold Fields). Anglo and Gold Fields extensive 
history within the South African economy and the context of the meetings will be examined, 
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behind the company’s intervening and reaching out to the ANC and the contribution the talks 
had on the official peace process. The study will end with an assessment of how the South 
African case study fits into track-two diplomacy theory and the ways in which features of the 



































The fall of the racist apartheid regime under the Nationalist Party (NP) leadership, the 
commencement of negotiations in South Africa and the first democratic and multi-racial 
elections on 27 April 1994 is hailed as one of the most momentous and victorious chapters in 
South Africa’s history. The ending of apartheid through peaceful means and no further 
violence or possibly civil war, is seen as a testament to the commitment of the leadership of 
the NP government and the ANC to an end to decades of systemic racism and oppressive 
government policies.  
The story of South Africa’s four years of official negotiations from 1990 to 1994; the delays, 
the breakthroughs and the threats to the entire process, were highly publicised and drew 
interest from all across the world, mostly due to relief considering the political and economic 
situation in South Africa in the 1980’s. However, far less is known about the secret meetings 
and discussions which took place under the radar and away from media attention between the 
ANC and members of the South African population, specifically Afrikaner intellectuals and 
businessmen, in the five years leading up to the South African negotiations. There were 
hundreds of meetings conducted throughout the 1980’s before the ANC and the government 
finally entered into official peace talks and many political analysts argue that these unofficial 
talks had a significant influential on the formal negotiations which took place in the early 
1990’s as well as the ultimate success of the negotiation process. This dissertation will focus 
specifically on two particular sets of unofficial, informal talks which were initiated, attended 
and facilitated by businessmen from the major mining corporations of Anglo American 
Corporation and Consolidated Gold Fields. Anglo representatives travelled to Lusaka, 
Zambia to meet with and discuss economic and political issues with the ANC leadership in 
exile and Gold Fields funded and organised meetings in England between ANC 
representatives and respected and influential members of the Afrikaner community. All these 
talks were conducted with no official mandate and were not considered negotiations, but 
rather information retrieval processes and enlightened discussions regarding South Africa’s 
political and economic issues. However, what started as highly informal and politically risky, 
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The reason why this topic is engaging and important is not only due to the significant impact 
the secret talks behind the scenes had on the South African political landscape, but who the 
role players were and what their motivations were for stepping in and potentially making 
themselves politically vulnerable in order to get involved. In the South African case, we are 
referring to two of the largest and most influential corporations in the South Africa. It can be 
argued that Anglo and Gold Fields have been the engines of the South African economy for 
almost a century, since the beginning of the mineral revolution and the start of South Africa’s 
modern economy. It is the sheer economic enormity of these companies that gives 
significance to these secret talks with the ANC in exile. The fact that Anglo and Gold Fields 
took the opportunity to get involved in South African politics at a hands on level, and reach 
out to an organisation like the ANC, which at this point were on the outskirts of official South 
African politics, regarded as a terrorist organisation, warrants discussion, not only into how 
this influenced the negotiation process in South Africa, but also why they got involved and 
what they hoped to gain from their engagement. This dissertation will unpack the reasoning 
and motivations behind Gold Fields and Anglo’s intervention into the political future of 
South Africa and will explore what they hoped to gain from their interaction with the ANC 
and how it fitted into their business strategies for future in South Africa. 
Further rationale for this research topic is the theory which is being used to explore it. Track-
two diplomacy is a new and exciting theory which has given further depth to prenegotiation 
theory and the understanding of how conflict resolution and peaceful transitions occur. 
Track-two diplomacy theory has also been shaped by this particular case study – the secret 
talks in South Africa has cemented track two diplomacy in political transition theory and has 
allowed it to play an important role in understanding the importance of prenegotiations in 
official, track one negotiations and peace talks. Lessons learned from the study of the South 
African case have been used to inform prenegotiation processes in places such as the Middle 
East and Northern Ireland, and furthermore, role players within the South African 
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Finally, this research topic is engaging due to the calibre of authors it has attracted. There are 
numerous highly respected authors who have done amazing work researching and exploring 
the back-channel negotiations in South Africa. Most of these authors were able to write about 
this topic at the time and just after the events occurred, capturing the players at their prime 
and gaining insightful understanding as to the thoughts and motivations behind the actions of 
those people involved at the time that these events were unfolding; from the ANC, the South 
African government and the private sector. It is the writing of these talented authors – Allister 
Sparks, Patti Waldmeir, Robert Harvey, Daniel Lieberfeld, Gail Gerhardt and Clive Glaser 
which will be used in this thesis to unpack the events in South Africa.  
Research Question 
 
The research question for this dissertation is: What role do private sector interests play in 
track-two diplomacy? This question is important as it allows for a significant contribution to 
the existing literature regarding unofficial negotiations in general and specifically in South 
Africa. The current literature regarding track-two diplomacy in South Africa does not take 
into consideration the impact certain actors have on the unofficial negotiation process. The 
aim of this research is therefore to build and add to the available body of work regarding 
track-two diplomacy in South Africa by contextualising it using the perspective of the private 
sector and explore the way in which participation by the mining sector, taking into 
consideration the sectors particular aims and interests, impacted on the official negotiation 
process in apartheid South Africa. The history of the South African economy and particularly 
the history of Anglo and Gold Fields in the South African economy are imperative as it 
provides important context to understanding why these companies felt the need to get 
involved in South African politics. One cannot understand why the concept of economic 
disinvestment from South Africa was such a challenging concept without a thorough 
understanding of the corporations deeply rooted foundation in the South African economy.  
Research Methodology 
 
This dissertation adopts a theory-orientated case study methodology1, which will locate the 
South Africa private sector case studies in the context of track-two diplomacy theory. This 
thesis will explore the theory regarding track-two diplomacy and apply it to the South African 
                                                
1 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (MIT Press, 2005), 
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case study. However, this dissertation will also go one step further and will fill in the gaps 
which exist in the current literature which doesn’t give enough weight to the motivations of 
the private sector and the way in which these particular interests influenced the track two 
negotiation process and the outcomes. This dissertation also has a strong historical 
component and discusses the way in which events in South African history have shaped more 
recent events; particularly how the economic strength of the gold mining corporations in 
South Africa later contributed to their ability to support the ANC and the end of apartheid. In 
recent years, there has been a renewed focus on historical analysis in social science studies2 
and this thesis highlights the importance of solid historical context when it comes to 
analysing a political question.  
Thesis Structure 
 
This dissertation will begin with a detailed exploration of the dominant literature regarding 
the unofficial track-two diplomacy initiatives in South Africa involving the mining sector 
between 1985 and 1990. Chapter one will focus on the six major authors who have 
contributed to the topic of secret talks with the ANC and will focus on what these authors 
have written about the private sector’s role in South Africa’s political transition, and more 
importantly, what the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments are. The chapter will then 
identify the gaps in the available literature with regarding to its theoretical focus, as well as 
the lack of focus on the motivations and interest of the private sector and how this influenced 
the track-two proceedings. The thesis later fills in these gaps by exploring the ways in which 
the motivations, position in the South African economy and actions of the private sector in 
South Africa can add to track- two diplomacy theory in the assessment section at the end of 
chapters three and four.  
Chapter two continues with a theoretical study of track-two diplomacy and unofficial 
negotiation theory, and will outline which literature will be used to conduct this South 
African-based theory case study. A study of prenegotiation literature will be conducted as 
track-two diplomacy falls under the banner of prenegotiation and therefore the prenegotiation 
literature gives conceptual context to track-two diplomacy. A detailed overview and 
discussion of track-two diplomacy theory, including dominant characteristics, requirements 
and desired outcomes will be done in chapter two. A study of the role of third party 
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intervention will also be done in order to characterise the role played by Anglo American and 
Gold Fields and identify the importance the of a third party can play in South African’s track-
two diplomacy events.  
Chapters three and four explore the South African case study, looking specifically at the 
series of dialogues which occurred between 1985 and 1990 and involved members of the 
mining sector, both as participants and mediators, and representatives of the ANC. Details of 
these talks in Lusaka in 1985 and in England between 1987 and 1990 will be discussed; 
including the participants, motivations of the parties concerned and the focus of the meetings, 
as well as the international and domestic environment in the 1980’s which had an influence 
on the mining company’s motivation to intervene in South Africa’s political issues. The 
consequences of these talks and the impact track-two diplomacy initiatives between the ANC 
and members of the private sector had on the political transition in South Africa will be 
explored and each chapter will end with an assessment in terms of track-two diplomacy 
theory and whether the meetings made a difference to the environment in which official 
negotiations occurred. This analysis will look at how these unofficial meetings between the 
ANC and the Anglo executives and the South African academics impacted on both the ANC 
and government’s strategies and the move towards participating in official negotiations on 
both sides of the fence. Finally, in chapter five the South African cases will be applied to the 
literature to assess the ways in which the Anglo and Mells park meetings fit within the track-
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
There has been much written on the subject area of the secret meetings in Lusaka and Mells 
Park between 1985 and 1990. This chapter looks at the writings of six major authors who 
have documented and written about the proceedings of the two meetings, including the 
environments in which they took place, the participants, the aims and objectives of the 
participants, the fears of those attending and details of how the meetings took place and what 
issues were discussed. These six authors have specifically been chosen for this chapter as 
they document the details of the proceedings of the meetings as well as had a significant 
amount of access to the participants of the meetings, allowing for first-hand accounts of what 
was discussed, and the importance of these discussions in the overall move towards official 
negotiations. These authors include a large amount of detail regarding what happened at the 
talks; however, they do disagree on some of the details of the meetings, including how some 
of the participants got involved in the process and how many meetings took place in Mells 
Park. What is lacking in these publications is a focus on the motivations and interests of the 
private sector and how the involvement of big business, specifically Anglo and Gold Fields, 
contributed to the move to official negotiations in 1990. It is this gap which this paper will fill 
and will explore the unique ways in which the actions of Anglo and Gold Fields in track-two 
diplomacy contributed to the ANC moving to the official negotiating table in 1990.  
This chapter is divided into three sections based on the approach the authors take on 
discussing the events which occurred in the South Africa case. Allister Sparks and Patti 
Waldmeir both take journalistic approaches to exploring the events and Robert Harvey 
provides a practitioner account due to his connections to the British government. Daniel 
Lieberfeld and Gerhardt and Glaser provide an academic perspective, with Lieberfeld taking 
a political science perspective and Gerhardt and Glaser taking a more historical perspective. 
1.1) The Journalistic Overview 
 
Allister Sparks’ book Tomorrow is Another Country is an account of the complex process and 
the important events which led to the end of apartheid and the beginning of peace talks in 
South Africa. Sparks' is regarded as one of South Africa’s leading journalists and he focuses 
attention on the critical role that certain individuals played in the country’s transition to 
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led to the negotiating table, he also explores the clandestine meetings which took place 
between the ANC and elite Afrikaners in England in the late 1980’s. According to Sparks, the 
process began during a meeting held in London by the ANC and British businessmen who 
had economic interests in South Africa. It was at this meeting that Michael Young from 
Consolidated Gold Fields approached Oliver Tambo, asking what British businessmen could 
do to help in the ANC fight. Young, before working for one of the largest international 
mining companies, was a political advisor to Prime Ministers Alec Douglas-Home and 
Edward Heath. Young reports that Tambo responded “I would like to see if we couldn’t have 
a dialogue with the Afrikaners.”3 Rudolph Agnew, Gold Field’s chairman, supported Young 
and agreed to fund the meetings and Young then went about approaching Afrikaners in South 
African who had connections to President Botha. Willie Esterhuyse and Sampie Terreblanche 
showed an interest in getting involved in the process and Neil Barnard from the National 
Intelligence Service approached Esterhuyse to spy for the organisation and report back on the 
meetings attended. Esterhuyse agreed to inform to the NIS and told Thabo Mbeki that the 
government was seeking through him an informal connection with the ANC.4 A second 
conduit of information was created by the inclusion of Willem de Klerk in the secret 
meetings. Wimpie ‘reported back surreptitiously to the man who was ultimately to make the 
decision to release Mandela and unban the ANC.’5 According to Sparks, F.W de Klerk was 
not pleased with his brother attending the talks and did not want to know about the 
discussions, to which Wimpie reported responded “too bad, I’m going to report back to you 
anyway, whether you like it or not.”6 Secrecy was important and Sparks describes that the 
process was ‘an elaborate exercise to have contact without running the political risk. If the 
meetings were found out, they could all be blamed on renegade individuals.’7 It was this 
plausible deniability that allowed for these ‘mock negotiations’ to continue. Sparks discusses 
how the first meeting between the two groups at Henley-on-Thames was tense and 
suspicious; however, over the twelve meetings between November 1987 and May 1990 a 
shared patriotism and unspoken fellowship developed.8 The meetings had a routine of dinner 
on Friday night and formal sessions on the Saturday and Sunday, which had a set agenda 
                                                
3Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated 
Settlement, (Jonathan Ball Publishers, PTY (Ltd), 1995), pp. 59.  
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prepared and chaired by Michael Young.9 According to Sparks, the topics of discussion 
ranged over ‘political developments in South Africa, the rise of international pressures, 
sanctions, the state of the economy, the possibility and implications of releasing Nelson 
Mandela, and what both sides believed could be done about the deepening racial conflict.’10 
Sparks emphasises that although the formal discussions were important, ‘the informal 
relationships and friendships were even more significant.’11 According to Esterhuyse 
“negotiations don’t always have to be formal, you can also use Glenfiddich to resolve a 
problem.”12 
 
Like Allister Sparks, Patti Waldmeir is also regarded as one of South Africa’s most talented 
journalists and has been reporting on South African politics for many years. Due to unique 
access she has had to important figures in South African politics, particularly in the ANC, 
Waldmeir in her book Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New 
South Africa, is able to give extraordinary detail as to the strategies and though processes 
behind many leaders within the South African struggle. She also allows for further details as 
the secret meetings which took place in Lusaka and England. Waldmeir looks at the role of 
the private sector in secret negotiations in chapter four, entitled ‘The Great Seduction’. 
Waldmeir identifies how Anglo American Corporation ‘struck a clever blow for capitalism 
when it became the first to break the taboo against talks with the ANC.’13 This meeting in 
Zambia in 1985 between the ANC and the Anglo executives ‘legitimised contact with the 
movement’14 Waldmeir explores the challenges faced by the participants before they even 
arrived in Zambia. On the ANC side, Oliver Tambo was afraid that meeting with Anglo 
would look like he was ‘selling out to capitalism’ and many of the businessmen who had 
committed to the meeting never got to Zambia due to pressure from P. W Botha. Waldmeir 
reports that it was trough the encouragement of Kenneth Kuanda that the meeting was 
eventually attended by Tambo. Tony Bloom, one of the businessmen who attended the 
meeting at Kaunda’s private game reserve, reported “I was surprised (almost overwhelmed) 
by the cordiality of the meeting. A more attractive and congenial group would be hard to 
imagine. There was a total lack of aggression, animosity or hostility towards us...the initial 





13Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa, 
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round of introductions was almost like a reunion.”15 Waldmeir also talks of the personal 
relationships that were forged at the meeting, particularly between Gavin Relly and Thabo 
Mbeki, who reportedly bonded over their shared a vice of pipe smoking. According to 
Waldmeir, the gulf between the economic policies of business and those of the ANC 
remained huge, specifically regarding the concept of nationalisation, as the ANC’s Freedom 
Charter advocated state ownership of ‘monopoly capital’.16 Waldmeir argues that the ANC’s 
aim for the meeting was persuading the Anglo executives that their investments would be 
safe, so that they would be ‘powerful ambassadors for change’ back in South Africa.17 
Waldmeir places emphasis on the message conveyed by the ANC to the businessmen which 
was that ‘they were patriots, as deeply and passionately committed to South Africa as any of 
their white visitors; that they were human beings – and moderate ones at that – not fanatical 
ideologues.’18 
 
Waldmeir describes the talks that occurred in England from 1987 to 1990 as being ‘thrice 
removed – talks about whether to talk about talks.’19 These talks were never intended to be 
official talks or negotiations. It was these meetings which were arranged by Michael Young 
from Gold Fields. Before the meetings in England between the ANC and members of the elite 
Afrikaner community began, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), led by Dr. Niel 
Barnard, approached Professor Willie Esterhuyse to spy at these meetings and report back to 
the NIS, and in turn the South African government. Esterhuyse had been approached by Gold 
Fields to represent the Afrikaner community at the first meeting in 1987 and Waldmeir 
discusses that by using Esterhuyse as a spy, the government was establishing a low-risk 
channel of communication with the ANC, with plausible deniability to the voters. “Publically 
P.W Botha could continue to declare that his government would never talk to terrorists. 
Esterhuyse would do it for him.”20 According to Waldmeir, the NIS was using this channel of 
communication to get information in order to achieve its goal, which was the splitting of the 
ANC. In 1987 the government still aimed at holding onto power. The ANC, according to 
Waldmeir, were using the talks to discuss the possibility of the transfer of power; neither side 
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at this point were ready or willing to share.21 Waldmeir argues that it is through these talks 
over the next three years that these views began to change, that a friendship grew between 
Thabo Mbeki, the head of the ANC delegation, and Esterhuyse, to the point where they held 
their own secret meetings which were unknown to the rest of the delegates. Esterhuyse had 
told Mbeki that he had been approached by the NIS and was reporting back on the meetings 
and Mbeki, according to Waldmeir, wanted this as it created ‘a reliable channel through 
which to feed his message of reassurance to Pretoria.’22 
Waldmeir places great emphasis on the value of the Mbeki-Esterhuyse friendship in the peace 
making process and discusses how the environment at Mells Park, with wine and whiskey 
being consumed by the fireplace, was highly conducive to relationship building in the 
evenings and creating an environment of trust between the delegates over the years.23 
According to Waldmeir, Esterhuyse identifies two phases to the Mells Park talks: how to start 
negotiations and positions and principles. Waldmeir also discusses how it was not only 
Barnard of the NIS that was receiving report backs about the meetings; Wimpie de Klerk, 
future president F.W de Klerk’s brother, attended some on the meetings at the end of 1988 
and was reporting back to F.W. It is reported that the ANC encouraged the invitation of 
Wimpie to Mells Park as they wanted to create a channel to F.W who was seen as highly 
conservative and a possible successor to Botha.24 The culmination of three years of talks 
ended with de Klerk unbanning the ANC and other liberation organisations and Waldmeir 
states that Mbeki and Esterhuyse watched the announcement that Mandela would be freed 
from prison together over a glass of champagne at Mells Park. Although Waldmeir discusses 
the atmosphere at Mells Park, as well as the motivations and opinions of the participants, like 
Sparks, she fails to discuss what influence the private sector had on the talks, and what their 
motivation was for getting involved at that point. It is the significance and influence of the 
involvement of Anglo and Gold Fields in these secret talks that will form the bases of this 
dissertation. 
1.2) A Practitioner’s Perspective 
 
In his book The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smuts to Mbeki, Robert Harvey 
gives a brief history of South African politics, however, more emphasis is placed on the 
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transition years in the 1980’s. Harvey is a highly regarded author, as well as a former British 
politician within the Conservative Party and the British House of Commons. Due to his 
political background, he is able to focus attention on the roles played by specific people 
within the South African conflict. He looks at the decisions and strategies of President Botha 
and the rise of President de Klerk and the influence this had to the transition. Harvey also 
discusses what he believes are the reasons for the fall of apartheid, which include 
international sanctions which placed great economic pressure on the government and the 
domestic violence, particularly in the black townships, which continued to bring the South 
African more and more admonishment from abroad. Harvey provides a detailed account of 
“the talks about talks” which took place at Mells Park in Chapter 12: Most Secret Conduit. It 
is due to contact with participants at these meetings that Harvey is able to provide a concise 
account of the events at Mells Park and the consequences which unfolded on the South 
African political stage. Harvey begins by outlining how Oliver Tambo approached Michael 
Young of Gold Fields to set up a channel of contact between the ANC and influential white 
South Africans. Harvey compares this task given too Young to ‘trying to act as an 
intermediary between the British and the Germans at the height of the Second World War.’25 
According to Harvey, Young’s task would be more difficult given that Gold Fields was seen 
as a pillar of the English community by the A rikaner community. Fear of retribution from 
the security services also meant that Young would have to approach Afrikaner elite in secret 
and risk being kicked out the country. Young began by contacting moderate, but prominent 
Afrikaners, including Sampie Terreblanche and Willie Esterhuyse at Stellenbosch University, 
Pieter de Lange, head of the Broederbond, Marinus Weickers, a professor at the University of 
South Africa and Willy Breytenbach, a senior civil servant in the government with close ties 
to the military. Many of the men Young approached declined attend the meeting in England; 
however, in the end, Terreblanche, Esterhuyse and Breytenbach agreed to cooperate with 
Young. The three men were believed to be well connected within the Afrikaner community 
and NP government and were prepared to meet with the ANC in England to discuss the 
current political crisis.26 Coordination with the participants before the first meeting was made 
difficult as the NIS had tapped the phones of Esterhuyse as well as the ANC headquarters in 
Lusaka. Harvey stresses the risks faced by the attendee’s, specifically the Afrikaner South 
African’s, who risked their professional reputations, their liberty, and conceivably their lives.  
                                                
25Robert Harvey, The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smuts to Mbeki, (Palgrace MacMillan, 
2001), pp. 125.  
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The first meeting, described by Young as enormously tense, occurred in October 1987 at the 
Compleat Angler in Marlow, England. The three Afrikaners met with an ANC delegation 
consisting of Aziz Pahad, Harold Wolpe and Tony Trew.27 Harvey explores the role played 
by Young during the first meeting; ‘Young ensured that the discussions were deliberately 
vague, and ranged over major issues without touching on specifics.’28 At the end of that first 
meeting, Harvey states that it was decided that the group should meet again and should have 
a more specific agenda going forward.  
In his book Harvey also places emphasis on the need for secrecy regarding the meetings and 
how Young had reported being followed at his home and office in London, presumable by 
South Africa’s state security bureau. Esterhuyse also received threats back home and was 
given instructions on how to search his car from bombs.29 It was evident that the South 
African government, at the least, suspected that communication between the ANC and 
prominent Afrikaners was taking place. However, Esterhuyse after the first meeting in 
England confirmed that he had been in touch with Niel Barnard of the NIS, and that he had 
told them about the meeting he had attended. What Harvey identifies as important is that 
President Botha was now definitely aware of Young’s actions and the plan to have more 
meetings and had made no move to stop them; ‘that he accepted that the talks should continue 
was extraordinary; that the Old Crocodile would himself give the talks his imprimatur was 
astonishing.’30 Botha’s actions indicated that he had decided to talk; ‘cautiously, secretly, 
indirectly.’31 Harvey also discusses how the NIS agreed to Esterhuyse telling Mbeki that he 
would be reporting back to the agency about the meetings. Mbeki was told at the second 
meeting and Harvey states that the ANC was secretly delighted with the news as ‘a channel 
had been opened  up to the very pinnacle of the whole, fearsome apparatus in South Africa – 
to President Botha and his shadowy intelligence chief. The next talks would not be a tense 
exchange of pleasantries after all, but hard negotiations on the main issues concerned, at just 
one remove, at the highest level between the two sides.’32 Young saw Botha’s secret approval 
of the talks as a ‘massive breakthrough’ but it was placed large pressure on the talks as the 
stakes had been raised by Botha’s tacit involvement. It also increased the need for secrecy as 
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this breakthrough would be threatened should conservative South African’s and government 
officials or militant ANC leaders find out about the talks and derail this diplomatic strategy.  
The second meeting occurred between 21 and 24 February at the Eastwell Manor Hotel, ‘the 
first direct negotiations between the ANC and the Afrikaners.’33 At this meeting, Thabo 
Mbeki, the then ANC director of communication, headed the ANC delegation. Harvey states 
that tensions were lower at this meeting, although both groups denied that they were given 
any mandate from either side to officially negotiate. This process was outlined by Young as 
‘creating a climate of change’.34 The four principal issues addressed at the meeting at 
Eastwell Manor were the cessation of violence, the ANC demand for majority rule, the fears 
about the ANC reputation for radicalism and the addressing of the white minority concerns 
for their own rights and cultures.35 The next round of talks occurred in August 1988 at Mells 
Park, a manor in England owned by Gold Fields. Harvey highlights the significance of the 
round of talks which occurred at Mells Park from 21 to 24 April. Earlier that year President 
Botha suffered a stroke and F.W de Klerk took over as leader of the Nationalist Party. Willem 
de Klerk, F.W’s brother attended the April talks and asked a question on behalf of his 
brother: would it be possible to start talks about talks with the ANC and what would the 
preconditions to talks be? This was the first time that an apartheid leader directly showed a 
desire to begin discussing the option of negotiations openly with the ANC and Mbeki 
responded saying that there would be no preconditions on the ANC side; however, they 
believed the release of Mandela would be a show of good faith. They also stated that the talks 
should focus on the issue of violence in the country, the participants in formal negotiations, 
the unbanning of the ANC and ending the state of emergency currently in place.36 This 
moment is described by Harvey as a breakthrough, although Mbeki and Esterhuyse 
reportedly already saw the Mells Park talks as pre-talks as information was being relayed 
directly to Tambo and Botha, and later de Klerk through his brother and the NIS.37 
Although Harvey provides much detail as to what was discussed at these meetings and how 
assisted in leading to the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC and the start 
of the official negotiation process, what he fails to do, as do Sparks and Waldmeir, is place 
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the events into a theoretical study. Nor does he provide an analysis of Gold Fields interests 
and why they chose to get involved and fund these clandestine talks. 
1.3) An Academic Account 
 
Gail Gerhardt and Clive Glaser discuss the South Africa’s political transition in their book 
From Protest to Challenge. Volume 6, entitled ‘Challenge and Victory, 1980 to 1990’ 
specifically includes information regarding the secret meetings which took place during the 
late 1980’s. One of the major strengths of Gerhardt and Glaser’s book is the inclusion of 
documents and memorandums written by the ANC in exile regarding their internal views and 
opinions regarding the meetings which were taking place. These documents provide valuable 
insight into how the ANC viewed these talks and what issues they placed emphasis on. 
Document 126 is entitled “Summary of Discussions between Certain Representatives of Big 
Business and Opinion-Makers in South Africa and the ANC. ANC memorandum, September 
14, 1985.”38 This document includes notes taken by the ANC delegates at the meeting with 
Anglo and media representatives in Zambia on 13 September 1985, described by the ANC as 
having a ‘cordial atmosphere.’39 The participants of the meeting were Gavin Relly, CEO of 
Anglo American Corporation, Dr. Zach de beer of Anglo, Tony Bloom of Premier Group 
Holdings, Tertius Myburgh, editor of the Sunday Times, Harald Pakendorf, editor of Die 
Vaderland, J. De L. Peter Sorder, Director of South African Foundation and Hugh Murray, 
editor of Leadership SA. Representing the ANC were President Tambo, Pallo Jordan, Mac 
Maharaj, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki and James Stuart. The ANC emphasises in this 
memorandum that the purpose of the meetings was not to talk about talks with the NP 
government, but rather to get to know each other and discuss the problems facing South 
Africa.40 The ANC reports that the business representatives believed that President Botha was 
committed to reforms and that further reforms were expected. According to the ANC, Big 
Business saw its role in South Africa as ‘maintaining good relations with the regime in the 
expectation that they could continue to quietly nudge the Botha regime towards reform.41 
One of the insights explored by the ANC in the memorandum is that Big Business is 
accepting the possibility that Botha’s regime will not survive much longer and are searching 
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for what they describe as ‘middle ground’ in the South African body politic.42 At the meeting, 
the businessmen raised their concerns regarding the armed struggle, the ANC’s relationship 
with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC’s economic policy.43 The 
ANC representatives report that they used this meeting as an opportunity to straighten out the 
major misconceptions the businessmen had about the positions of the ANC, stating that they 
did not relish violence but that it was the state which has made the armed struggle necessary. 
The ANC delegates outlined the organisation’s economic policy which was based on the 
original Freedom Charter and advocated ‘a re-distribution of the wealth of our country in 
contrast to the present economic order which is characterised by extremes of wealth co-
existing with gross mass poverty.’44 This re-distribution would require the nationalisation of 
the monopoly industries, banks and mines. They also requested that Big Business in South 
Africa ‘take a more positive position’ against the apartheid regime, which they have failed to 
do in the past decades.45This positive position was outlined as the need to ‘publically increase 
and step up the pressure on the regime especially with regard to the release of Nelson 
Mandela and all political prisoners’46 as well as lifting the state of emergency and ban on the 
ANC and removing troops and police from black townships.  
Gerhardt and Glaser also discuss how Niel Barnard, head of the NIS, was monitoring a series 
of secret talks being conducted in Britain between the ANC and members of the Afrikaner 
establishment.47 Barnard was being informed by Willie Esterhuyse, one of the Afrikaner 
delegates. The talks were initiated by Michael Young, a British businessman, reportedly at 
the request of Oliver Tambo. The first meeting took place in October 1987 and was attended 
by three Stellenbosch professors, Esterhuyse, Sampie Terreblanche and Willie Breytenbach, 
who provided information regarding the government’s thinking and identified that the first 
issues to be discussed were what the preconditions for negotiations would be and ‘what kind 
of future political system would be mutually acceptable for both sides.’48 Thanks to these 
talks ‘an almost direct – but still deniable – line of communication had been opened through 
which the two sides could explore each other’s minimum demands.’49 This line of 
communication became even more direct in 1988 when Wimpie de Klerk became a 
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participant and reported back to his brother F.W de Klerk, who became South Africa’s 
president in 1989. Gerhardt and Glaser outline the contributions the series of seven secret 
meetings had on the South African conflict. Firstly, the talks affected the opinion of the 
Afrikaner participants, helping them to realise that ‘the people at the ANC’s helm were not 
monsters. They were reasonable, educated, civilised people; moderate leaders.’50 According 
to Gerhardt and Glaser ‘friendships were formed and acknowledgement of a common 
patriotism became possible in spite of underlying fears and mistrust.’51 Gerhardt and Glaser 
do provide insight into the psychological importance of these talks for both sides, and the 
book places emphasis on the relationships and friendships that were formed. However, like 
Sparks, Waldmeir and Harvey, there remains a theoretical element and an understanding of 
the important role the private sector played and why.  
Daniel Lieberfeld is an important author for this thesis as not only has he written extensively 
on the secret meetings which took place behind the scenes of the South African conflict, but 
he also conducts a theoretical study as to where the meetings in Zambia and Mells Park fall 
within conflict resolution and prenegotiation theory in his papers Evaluating the Contribution 
of Track-Tow Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984 – 90 and Promoting 
Tractability in South African and Israel/Palestine: The Role of Semiofficial Meetings.  On 13 
September 1985 four executives from the Anglo-American Corporation, as well as three 
members of the South African media, flew to Zambia to meet with Oliver Tambo and other 
ANC leaders in exile. Daniel Lieberfeld discusses how Kenneth Kuanda, Zambia’s President, 
organised the meeting, due to his relationships with the ANC, and Gavin Relly, Anglo’s 
CEO. The private sector participants at the meeting, identified by Lieberfeld, were Gavin 
Relly, Peter Sorour, the South Africa Foundation (SAF) chief executive, Zac de Beer, an 
executive director at Anglo and Anthony Bloom, CEO of Premier Milling, a company part-
owned by Anglo.  ANC President Oliver Tambo, who had been based in exile at the ANC 
headquarters in Lusaka, attended the meeting, as well as Thabo Mbeki. Lieberfeld theorises 
that the Anglo representatives were in a unique position to reach out and conduct talks with 
the ANC in exile as it would have been politically risky for the South African government to 
act against large corporations who the government relied on economically. Due to Anglo’s 
position as the largest company in South Africa, it would not have been politically wise to 
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seize the CEO’s passport.52 Lieberfeld identifies Anglo’s motivation for engaging in dialogue 
with the ANC as wanting to ‘establish a relationship between the wealth-producing sector 
and a new African economic policy.’53  Anglo had also experienced the nationalisation of the 
majority of its mining interests in Zambia after gaining independence in the 1970’s and the 
company feared that the ANC would follow a nationalisation route once apartheid was 
abolished and the party came to power. Due to this fear, Lieberfeld outlines that the 
businessmen asked whether ANC economic policy envisioned state control and 
nationalisation of industries. The businessmen stressed that political progress depended on 
economic growth, which capitalism could effectively produce.54 According to Lieberfeld, the 
ANC saw the benefit of talks with the Anglo representatives as ‘enhancing the democratic 
forces and weakening and demoralising the regime.’55 Kuanda chaired the meeting and 
placed emphasis on the fact that the aim was not to make any decisions. The environment 
was said, by participants, to be relatively laid back, with the men referring to each other by 
their first names and creating a ‘fraternal atmosphere.’56 Lieberfeld reports that Gavin Relly 
identified the meeting as ‘one of the nicest days I have ever spent.’ According to Lieberfeld, 
the significance of the Zambia meeting was that it opened the floodgates of international 
business to deal with the ANC and showed that the ANC was being taken seriously as a 
potential ‘government-in-exile’ by the private sector in South Africa.57 
Lieberfeld also discusses the series of six meetings held in England between 1987 and 1990. 
Participants in these meetings were elite members of the Afrikaner community and senior 
ANC officials. What Lieberfeld identifies is important is that many of the Afrikaner 
participants had ties to the NP government, and some were even members of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond, “ a secret ethnic organisation whose leadership had long controlled mainstream 
Afrikaner politics, culture and business.”58 Lieberfeld looks at the role Gold Fields played in 
the planning of these meetings. He discusses how the company’s Vice-Chairman Humphrey 
Woods, tried unsuccessfully to arrange such meetings and that it was eventually a consultant 
for Gold Fields that contacts Willie Esterhuyse, a professor of political philosophy at 
                                                
52Daniel Lieberfeld, Evaluating the Contribution of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in 
South Africa, 1984 – 1990, (Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No.3, May 2002), pp. 360. 
53Lieberfeld, Evaluating the Contribution of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South 
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Stellenbosch University. Esterhuyse went on to represent the Afrikaner interest at the Mells 
Park meetings from 1987 to 1990 when the ANC was eventually unbanned by President F.W 
de Klerk.59 The involvement of Gold Fields also went further as to having Michael Young, 
head of communications and corporate affairs, chairing the meetings. As discussed by 
Lieberfeld, the motivation for the meetings the ANC side was to increase the number of 
‘politically influential Afrikaners to the circle of those with whom the ANC had contacts.’60 
Lieberfeld argues that the meetings in England were significant in that they were ‘the first 
substantive ‘proximate talks’ between the ANC in exile and the South African 
government.”61 This approximation was achieved through the connection between the 
Afrikaner participants, particularly Esterhuyse, and the NIS which, according to Lieberfeld, 
contacted Esterhuyse and asked that he report back to the NIS about what was discussed at 
the meetings. This was done so under the knowledge of the ANC and led to the organisation 
seeing the Afrikaner participants as playing an ‘emissary role’ for the NIS and the NP 
government.62 The talks revolved around both politics and economics, particularly the 
requirements for official negotiations on both sides. Report backs to the NIS and white South 
Africans by the Afrikaner participants centred around the ANC’s ‘willingness to negotiate, 
it’s decreasing commitment to ‘armed struggle’ and its willingness to handle minority rights, 
i.e. of whites, with sensitivity.’63 Lieberfeld discusses the impact these meetings in England 
had on both the NP and ANC’s policies and choices for the future of South Africa. During the 
time in which these secret talks were occurring, the NP was still trying to discredit the ANC 
within the country. However, the Mells Park meetings ‘helped to legitimise the ANC as a 
negotiation partner’64 within South Africa and undermined the government’s strategy. It also 
caused a polarisation among Afrikaners, those who supported negotiations and those who 
wanted to remain strong and continue to fight for power. The Conservative Party (CP) used 
unofficial talks as a show of weakness on the side of the NP government, threatening the 
NP’s support base.65 On the ANC side, secret meetings furthered the strategy of ‘winning 
white’s support for majority rule’ as the meetings showed that through discussions, this 
strategy could gain ground. Lieberfeld also outlines how the secret meetings caused the ANC 
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to begin specifying its preconditions for official negotiations.66 Lieberfeld concludes that the 
Mells Park meetings consistently highlighted participants shared identity as South Africans 
and contributed significantly to lowered threat perceptions and to increased willingness to 
negotiate.67 This in turn created an environment in which decision makers began to realise 
that ‘a negotiated resolution was possible in terms of both strategic goals and domestic 
politics.’68 However, there is little discussion of the specific motivations of Gold Fields and 
what influence the involvement of the corporation had on these meetings and the decisions 
taken by the ANC and the government.  
Although all the authors discussed in the above chapter explore the details of the secret 
meetings attended by members of the business sector and all make important contributions to 
our understanding of the events which resulted in the abolishment of apartheid, many are 
lacking a theoretical focus. Lieberfeld does look at the unofficial negotiations from a track-
two diplomacy theoretical basis; however, he fails to look at the ways in which the interest 
and motivations of the private sector, specifically Anglo and Gold Fields, influenced and 
impacted the transition process and how the South African experience can contribute to track-
two diplomacy theory. Commercial interests bring a different dimension to negotiations and 
diplomatic proceedings and the motivations of the interested parties define how the process 
unfolds.  
The following chapter will outline and comprehensively explore the relevant theories relating 
to track-two diplomacy and will lay the theoretical foundation for the South African case 
study. The chapter outlines prenegotiation theory and track-two diplomacy theory, including 
its requirements and objectives, which forms the lens through which the talks in South Africa 
with private sector involvement will be looked at. The chapter will end with a discussion on 
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Chapter Two: Track-Two Diplomacy 
 
Now that the major literature regarding the unofficial meetings between the ANC and the 
Anglo and Gold Fields representatives has been discussed in chapter one, the South African 
case study has been established. The next step is to identify and outline the theory which will 
be used to conduct this case study. Chapter three begins with a study of prenegotiation 
literature as track two diplomacy falls under prenegotiation and an exploration of 
prenegotiation literature provides conceptual context. Track-two diplomacy theory will then 
be explored and its characteristics identified. The role of third party intervention will also be 
explored in order to analyse the role played by members of the private sector in the South 
African peace-making process, as well as the roles played by the mediators at the meetings, 
Kenneth Kuanda and Michael Young. The most authoritative authors on prenegotiation, 
track-two diplomacy and third-party intervention will be used in this chapter.  
The theory of track-two diplomacy will be the lens through which the South African case 
study will be analysed. This chapter will identify the purpose and aims of track-two 
diplomacy processes and will outline how track-two diplomacy makes an important 
contribution to official track-one negotiations.  
2.1) Prenegotiation 
 
Negotiation is defined as “a discussion between two or more parties with the apparent aim of 
resolving divergence of interest and thus escaping social conflict.”69 Within conflict 
resolution, negotiation can be used to settle conflicts regarding individuals, individuals, 
organisations or nations.70 Pruitt and Carnevale argue that divergence of interests, parties 
having incompatible preferences among a set of available options, is found in international 
relations and that negotiation theory is useful in the understanding of political conflicts. The 
functions of negotiation, according to Pruitt, are the development of specific agreements, the 
development of longer term policies about roles, obligations and privileges and mediation of 
social change,71 all of which can aid in ending or lessening a conflict. The authors of 
Negotiation in Social Conflict also identify five negotiation strategies: Concession making 
which entails reducing one’s goals, demands or offers; Contending by trying to persuade the 
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pp. 2. 
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other party to concede and not conceding oneself; Problem solving which tries to locate and 
adopt options that satisfy both parties; Inaction which involves doing as little as possible and; 
Withdrawal when a party drops out of the negotiation process.72 
According to I. William Zartman there is an important step that comes before negotiation and 
plays an important role in peace making and that considering that negotiations begin when 
parties come to the official negotiating table “in fact takes no account of the most challenging 
phase of preparations and therefore misses an important aspect of the process of narrowing 
disagreement between parties.”73 Zartman therefore defines prenegotiation as beginning 
“when one or more parties considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates this 
intention to other parties. It ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations (an exchange 
of proposals designed to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome in a situation of 
interdependent interests) or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation as an 
option.74 The nature of prenegotiation lies in the parties concerned coming to the conclusion 
that “some joint solution is possible.”75 Zartman through the study of numerous case studies 
comes to the conclusion that prenegotiation is necessary in the negotiation process, referring 
to it as a “preparatory phase without which the negotiation would not have taken place.”76 
Zartman also argues that prenegotiation is a period of transition during which perceptions and 
behaviours are changes and that by the end of the prenegotiation phase adversaries are 
capable of cooperating and forming some form of trust.77 
The function of prenegotiation is ultimately to facilitate a shift to “a conciliatory mentality, 
believing solution is to be found, with, not against, the adversary and preparing to give a little 
to get something, to settle for an attainable second best rather than hold out for an 
unattainable victory.”78 Zartman argues that the risks associated with prenegotiation are lower 
and that this increases its chance of success. The reasons given are that “exit costs are lower 
in prenegotiation, where no engagements have actually been made as yet, parties can be freer 
about stating maximum terms and real interests clearly. The exchange of information reduces 
the unknown and hence the risks of eventual concessions.”79 The parties, according to 
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Zartman, come to know what to expect and allows the transition to official negotiations to be 
smoother and less tense.  Studies on conflict resolution advocate that the concept of 
requitement, the reciprocity of actions between adversaries within a resolution process, is a 
vitally important element in the move towards negotiations.  In the resolution of a conflict it 
is important for adversarial groups to see that concessions will be repaid with concessions.80 
According to Zartman, prenegotiations are the best time to indicate that concessions will be 
reciprocated as neither party is committing to any specific concessions but are merely 
assuring each that they are prepared to do so.81 This exploring of concessions and how 
concessions will be responded to by the other party is important to this dissertation as this 
was one of the important issues discussed at the Mells Park talks and allowed for both parties 
to increase not only their understanding of their adversary, but also what they were willing to 
give up in the quest for peace. The topic of concessions will be further looked at in chapter 
four which studies the agenda of the Mells Park talks in greater detail. Track-two diplomacy 
can be considered to be a theory which fits into the broader framework of prenegotiations and 
that many of the functions of track-two diplomacy, discussed in the next section of the 
chapter, fit the aims and objectives of the prenegotiation process, which Zartman considers so 
important in conflict resolution. 
2.2) Track-Two Diplomacy 
 
Conflict resolution is a field which calls for the voluntary participation and mutual agreement 
of parties to produce self-sustaining agreements and improve relations.82 Within the field of 
conflict resolution falls the practice of interactive conflict resolution (ICR), which, according 
to Ronald J. Fisher, “provides a quiet, neutral, low risk forum for influential but unofficial 
representatives of parties to come together and engage in frank discussions and sustained 
analysis with the guidance and facilitation of an impartial and skilled third party.”83 Track- 
two diplomacy is applied in the field of interactive conflict resolution.   
Joseph Montville defines track-two diplomacy as ‘unofficial, non-structured interaction 
between members of adversarial groups that is directed towards conflict resolution through 
                                                
80Ibid, 245. 
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addressing psychological factors.’84 Unofficial talks are different to official, formal talks 
which involve the direct participants of the conflict communicating in a forum where they are 
able to negotiate a treaty or a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Daniel Lieberfeld within the 
analysis of facilitated track-two initiatives distinguishes between “hard” track-two and “soft” 
track-two. Lieberfeld uses representatives, third party, dialogue mode and objectives as the 
main factors which identify and distinguish hard and soft track-two initiatives. Lieberfeld 
also outlines specific types of interactions, all of which fall under the general sphere of track-
two diplomacy.85 Within the ”hard” track-two initiative frameworks Lieberfeld makes a 
distinction between semi-official talks, also referred to track-one-and-a-half. Within semi-
official talks the representatives of the conflicting parties are mixed, including either senior 
officials or non-officials, possibly citizens, who have been granted a mandate to conduct the 
talks on behalf of each party. Within the talks there is a third party, or mediator, who is often 
non-official but is closely connected and has access to the relative authorities. This 
facilitation is also stated by Lieberfeld as being less active than a traditional mediatory role. 
The dialogue mode of semi-official talks is informal and usually done in secrecy, with 
confidentiality being a priority and the prime objective is to provide a basis, or foundation for 
official track-one negotiations between adversaries to occur. The important factor here is the 
mandate which the parties at the table are given.  
According to Lieberfeld there are also types of track-one diplomacy which fit into the 
category of track-two initiatives and these involve track-one back-channel negotiations 
(BCN’s).  As with typical track-one diplomacy, the proceedings are officially sanctioned and 
attended by the direct adversaries of a conflict. However, BNC’s are conducted in secrecy 
and often occur in parallel to with the official front-channel negotiations.86  Back-channel 
negotiations therefore accompany but do not replace the official formal negotiation process.  
The negotiators in back-channel initiatives mainly have a close relationship to top decision 
makers87 and within conflict resolution practices agreements have often been reached during 
back-channel negotiations rather than through the official negotiation process. Back-channel 
negotiations have occurred frequently within the Israel-Palestine conflict and have been 
studied to identify their ability to facilitate agreements between adversarial groups.  However, 
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Official Meetings, (American Behavioral Science, 2002), pp. 4. 
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most track-two initiatives are conducted before parties have come to the table and are 
therefore part of the prenegotiation process. 
There are a number of factors which identify track-two diplomacy initiatives and others 
which distinguish track-two diplomacy from the more formal, track-one negotiations 
commonly seen in conflict resolution. Firstly, participants in the talks need to belong to 
adversary groups88 and secondly, specific political solutions and programmes for action 
within the conflict are discussed during the diplomatic processes.89 Another requirement of 
track-two diplomacy, according to Lieberfeld, is that no participants are in the position to 
negotiate, and therefore do not have an official mandate. The is aim is to provide an informal 
arena in order for doors of communication to be opened between conflicting groups and 
issues relating to the conflict to be discussed in an unofficial, and therefore less intimidating, 
environment.  
Lieberfeld summarises the functions of track-two diplomacy as Exploration, Clarification and 
Verification.90 Participants are able to build a foundation of understanding and common 
ground by exploring responses to specific proposals. It also allows adversarial groups to 
clarify their positions and demands to each other and verify and refute opinions or beliefs 
they have about their opposition or refine their own policies. Track-two engagements are 
generally less politically risky due to their nature of secrecy and parties are therefore able to 
consider formal dialogue and begin testing the waters in a safer space, without the fear of 
political, social or economic repercussions or committing to an official peace-making 
process. Track-two initiatives “seek to build relationships of working trust among 
representatives of adversarial groups and feed ideas and proposals into the political process.91 
However, in order to feedback information into the political process a direct connection and 
line of communication with decision makers and top leadership is necessary. Track-two 
negotiations can therefore decrease conflict caused by miscalculation or misunderstanding, 
and can also “contribute to stability over the longer term by fostering change at the personal 
level, rather than just at the government level.”92 In essence, track-two diplomacy has the 
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ability to bring together members of opposing sides when leaders cannot be brought together 
in an official capacity. Track-two dialogue is also used when the option of track-one dialogue 
is not yet an official or openly accepted option in a conflict but an opportunity to explore 
other options is on the table.  
Track-two diplomacy plays an important role in a prenegotiation process. However, it much 
be remembered that the point of prenegotiation is to create or improve an environment in 
which negotiations can take place. Track-two diplomacy supports track-one diplomacy as this 
is where concrete decisions are made by leaders, where concessions are agreed to, and 
conflicts are ended by signed agreements. Track-two diplomacy lays the foundation for track-
one diplomacy to build on.  What is therefore important to explore at this point in this 
dissertation is what influence track-two diplomacy has on track-one proceedings. Lieberfeld 
in his paper “Evaluating the Contribution of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination 
in South Africa, 1984 - 90” discusses five major influences that link these two processes. The 
first influence is creating a shared sense of possibility that the end to a conflict can be 
negotiated. This is achieved through exploration which increases understanding and therefore 
minimises threat perception between adversaries, and instead is replaced by ‘a joint search for 
co-operative solutions.’93 The second influence of track-two diplomacy on track-one 
proceedings is reducing threat perception through the process of exploration, verification and 
clarification which has already been discussed. Thirdly, unofficial talks can cause a shift in 
public opinion and ‘create latent political support for negotiation that increases the political 
feasibility of official, track-one talks.’94 The fourth function influence of track-two 
diplomacy, according to Lieberfeld, is that it fulfils a ‘preparatory function’ within the 
participating parties. Participants are able to familiarise themselves with the oppositions 
objectives and opinions, as well as gain experience on discussing issues – a skill which can 
be used during the official negotiation process. The participants in the meetings also become 
champions for negotiations in their parties and can push this agenda as they are able to see its 
merits and become comfortable with the concept. Finally, track-two diplomacy can play the 
important role of creating a new perspective for members within an adversarial group who 
are opposed to or distrust negotiations and are advocates for continued violence. Participants 
are able to gain further information and weigh options and gage the possibility of success of 
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further violence. All these outcomes of track-two diplomacy are transferred to track-one 
negotiations and ‘enable a smoother negotiation process.’95 
2.3) Third Party Intervention 
 
An exploration of third party intervention identifies the important role that mediation played 
in the track-two diplomacy initiatives with the ANC. According to Jürgen Rüland, 
“globalisation, economic liberalisation and the concomitant growing interdependence have 
given rise to the emergence of new actors in international relations. International 
organisations and regimes as well as transnational actors such as multinational corporations 
and internationally organised Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) are not only 
numerically proliferating as empirical evidence suggests, but also factually playing an 
increasingly prominent role in international politics.”96  One of the ways in which these new 
actors are participating in conflict resolution is through third party intervention and as has 
been discussed in the previous section on track-two diplomacy, third party intervention is an 
important factor in ICR.  
Vamik Volkan, an American psychiatrist, conducted extensive research into conflict 
resolution, and more specifically, in the use of both official and unofficial diplomacy in 
conflict resolution.97 Within official diplomatic processes, diplomats are said to pursue ‘a 
highly rational and ritualised approach that downplays the significant role of emotions and 
does not acknowledge or understand deeper psychological processes of intergroup conflict. 
According to Volkan, unofficial diplomacy fills this gap by its ability to ‘humanise the 
conflict and build confidence between the parties so that they can overcome hatred and move 
towards negotiations.’98 A neutral third party, referred to by Volkan as a ‘catalyst group’,99 is 
said to be essential to the success of unofficial diplomacy as it is the third parties role to bring 
together the opposing parties for meetings in which it is hoped that they will become 
acquainted and develop relationships.  
Third party intervention, according to Fisher and Keashly, consists of six different types, one 
of which is conciliation. Conciliation within the role of third party intervention is outlined as 
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‘a trusted third party which provides a communication link between the antagonists to assist 
in identifying major issues, lower tension, and moving them toward direct interaction, 
typically negotiation.’100 Conciliation is said to have a low to moderate degree of control over 
the unofficial negotiations, mainly due to their outlined role as a mediator who may have a 
degree of control over the flow of talks but is allocated only as much status in the talks as is 
given by the parties concerned. Consultation involves a skilled third party who facilitates 
problem-solving through communication and pure mediation is said to use reasoning, 
persuasion, and control of information and suggestion of alternatives to facilitate a negotiated 
settlement.101 Power mediation implements leverage in the form of punishment or reward in 
order to bring about a settlement of conflicts and arbitration results in a judgement and the 
imposing of a settlement.102 Peacekeeping is the maintenance of a peace agreement or 
ceasefire by a third party, which in international conflicts is often done by the United Nations 
(UN).103 These six types of third party intervention are used in different scenarios depending 
on the conditions of the conflict and the desired outcome. Within the South African case 
study, this dissertation identifies that Gold Fields played a conciliatory role, linking the ANC 
with influential Afrikaners. In the meeting between the ANC and Anglo representatives, it 
was Zambian president Kenneth Kuanda who acted in a conciliatory role due to his 
relationship with both the ANC and Anglo America. Further discussion on the role of third 
party intervention will occur in chapters three and four.  
Bryant Wedge, an American psychiatrist with an interest in international relations and 
conflict resolution, identified that the psychological elements of international relations are 
dangerous and unstable and can be a major source of unpredictability. His concept of a 
‘psychiatry of internatio al affairs’ he believed would increase predictability and could help 
understand the irrational elements of destructive conflict.104 Wedge first put his theory to the 
test as an unofficial third party mediator in the Dominican Republic conflict in 1965. 
Through his experiences Wedge identified a general five-stage model of third party 
intercession.  
• Stage one: Establish contact with each side as an interested outsider and initiate a 
dialogue process. 
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• Stage two: Each side’s interests are defined and mutual interests identified. 
 
• Stage three: The two sides are brought together on neutral ground. 
 
• Stage four: Assistance provided to the parties in considering cooperation programmes. 
 
• Stage five: Intercession ends once cooperative programmes have been established.105 
 
The point where unofficial and official diplomacy meets and ‘insights and options generated 
in unofficial diplomacy are communicated to and considered by official diplomacy is defined 
by Fisher as Critical Juncture. This point can be reached by reports from unofficial 
participants to government or by involving official diplomats in sessions in an unofficial 
capacity.’106 Critical juncture is an important aim of track-two diplomacy as it is only at this 
point that concrete steps towards official track-one negotiations and a peace agreement can be 
reached.  
It is through the lens of track-two diplomacy that the meetings held between and facilitated 
by the private sector within the South Africa conflict will be analysed. An assessment will 
also be conducted as to how these meetings qualify as track-two diplomacy and how they 
contributed to the peace process and the start of formal negotiations between the South 
African government and the ANC in 1990. What the current track-two theory doesn’t do is 
differentiate between the parties involved in track-two diplomacy and the ways in which this 
can and does influence the unofficial negotiation process. Parties play a role in the outcome 
and it will be different between private sector, NGO’s and political organisations due to their 
specific aims and objectives with regard to involving themselves in the conflict. Within the 
South African case study, it was the particular interests and position of Anglo and Gold 
Fields in the national economy which allowed them to take on a third party role and initiate 
vital track-two diplomacy within the anti-apartheid conflict. The following chapter will 
examine the first of the South African case study chosen for this thesis - the meeting between 
Anglo executives and the ANC in Zambia in 1985 and will outline the context in which this 
meeting took place both domestically and internationally, the details of who attended the 
meeting and what was discussed, as well as Anglo’s motivations and the influence this 
meeting had on informal negotiations and the eventual abolition of apartheid.  
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South African Case Study 
Chapter Three: Anglo’s Trek to Lusaka 
 
The first unofficial or track-two initiative within the South African conflict which will be 
explored in this paper took place on 13 September 1985 in Lusaka, Zambia. It was attended 
by high level members of the ANC, including its president, Oliver Tambo, and four 
executives from Anglo American Corporation, including Gavin Relly, its Chief Executive 
Officer, and was chaired by Kenneth Kuanda, the Zambian President. Kuanda coordinated 
the meeting due to his relationships with both Tambo and Relly. This was the first meeting 
held between important and influential members of the South African private sector and the 
ANC throughout the apartheid era. In this chapter the history of the Anglo American 
Corporation within the South African private sector and the gold mining industry, in order to 
understand the importance of the South African economy to the company’s operations. The 
context within which this meeting took place will be discussed in three categories; the armed 
struggle, the financial retreat from South Africa, including by international banks and 
countries through the imposing of sanctions, and building social sentiment internationally 
against the apartheid regime. The details of who participated in the meeting and what was 
discussed will be explored and chapter three will end with an outline of Anglo’s motivations 
for reaching out to the ANC in exile and the consequences of the meeting with regard to its 
influence on the conflict and the move to official, track-one negotiations with the apartheid 
government. This chapter is important to the overall aim of this thesis as it outlines the role 
and motivation of Anglo specifically in track-two diplomacy and explores the company’s 
interests in getting involved with unofficial talks with the ANC in exile. It has been 
established that Anglo was involved in track-two diplomacy in South Africa, the important 
question which this thesis answers in why they chose to get involved and how this 
involvement contributed to official peace talks.  
3.1) Anglo’s History within South Africa’s Economy 
 
Ernst Oppenheimer founded the Anglo American Corporation on 25 September 1917.107 He 
had first come to South Africa in 1902 as a representative of A. Dunkelsbuhler and Co, a 
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London based diamond merchant in Kimberly. After working in Kimberly and even 
becoming its Mayor108 Oppenheimer became interested in gold, and specifically South 
Africa’s growing gold industry in the Transvaal. ‘Modern’ gold mining on a large scale kick 
started the resource industries which are still operating today. There are indications that low 
scale mining activity had been conducted by locals in the Witwatersrand area as early as 
1845. However, these activities were conducted on a small scale and the South African ‘gold 
rush’ and major western interest and investment in the gold and diamond fields, as well as the 
massive influx of international prospectors and businessmen seeking their fortunes, such as 
Cecil Rhodes, Barney Barnato and Ernst Oppenheimer, occurred after 1886, and the 
subsequent investment in the Witwatersrand gold fields allowed the industry to grow rapidly 
and caused South Africa to become the largest gold producer in the world for many years. 
The main gold reef of the Witwatersrand was discovered in 1886 on Langlaagte farm, 
situated on the outskirts of what became aptly known as the City of Gold, Johannesburg, 
within the Transvaal Republic.109 The Witwatersrand developed to become the main gold 
fields of South Africa; although gold deposits were also discovered in the Eastern Transvaal 
and in the Orange Free State. Geographically, the gold-bearing ore found on the 
Witwatersrand was low grade compared to mining areas in Australia and South America and 
is concentrated in a relatively small area. Another characteristic of the Wits gold fields is that 
the ‘gold belt’, the seam of gold producing ore, moves on a slanting110 or downward 
trajectory and goes deeper and deeper underground making it expensive and time consuming 
to get to.111 Many mines would exhaust the gold supplies on the surface and would have to 
give up production and close the mine as they did not have the money or technology to 
continue digging deeper.112 
The high start-up capital that was needed for mining operations on the Witwatersrand 
resulted in a monopoly; a hand full of wealthy and internationally financed mining houses, 
many of which had already began operations on the diamond mines in Kimberly. The reality 
for the early mining companies was that there was a large potential amount of gold to be 
mined; however, to optimise profit, miners would have to go deep into the earth and extract 
                                                
108Anthony Sampson, Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and Apartheid, (Hodder and 
Stoughton, London, 1987), pp. 55. 
109Francis Wilson, Labour in South African Gold Mines, (Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 14.  
110Glenn Saxon Jr, Gold Mining in South Africa, The Analysts Journal, Vol. 9, No. 5, Nov 1953, (CFA 
Institute), pp. 61. 












Page | 36  
 
large amounts of low grade ore. The mining houses therefore had to keep costs in controllable 
areas as low as possible, and this meant maintaining a cheap labour force, as well as avoiding 
competition for labour which would drive up costs, causing reliance on a large and consistent 
pool of cheap labour. The shortage of cheap labour has plagued the gold mining industry in 
South Africa since its inception as the industry needed an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 black 
miners each year to do the majority of the unskilled work.113 In September 1917 
Oppenheimer received significant US funding and formed the Anglo American Corporation, 
which was based in Johannesburg, South Africa. The new company had both US, British and 
South African share capital and was envisioned as a major new mining house which would 
compete on the same level as companies such as Gold Fields.114 The company began by 
purchasing mining rights on the Far East Rand and although Oppenheimer and Anglo were 
late on the South African gold scene unlike many of his competitors, the company thrived. 
Anglo also bought a large number of mining rights in the Orange Free State, an area which 
had not yet been extensively mined but turned out to be one of the most profitable gold 
regions in the country.  
Oppenheimer continued to have an interest in diamonds after his early days in the Kimberly 
mining industry and began to build Anglo’s diamond portfolio in South Africa. After 
numerous failed attempts, Oppenheimer bought a significant amount of shares in De Beers, 
Cecil Rhodes’s original company, and on 20 December 1929 he was voted in as the 
company’s Chairman.115 From there the company bought large diamond interests in 
numerous African countries, including in Namibia, Angola, the Congo and Northern Zambia 
(then Rhodesia). Anglo began to diversify into the South African industrial and service 
sectors in the early 1900’s. These industries included paper manufacturing (Mondi Paper Co), 
newspaper publishing (Argus and Times media groups), vehicle distribution, construction and 
engineering, freight services, property development, retail and financial services. It is 
believed that by 1976 Anglo and its subsidiaries held top positions in all South African 
economic sectors except agriculture116 but this was all made possible due to the huge profits 
made from the South African gold mines and Anglo became “the cornerstone of the new 
South African capitalism and which developed into the biggest concentration of financial 
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power in the continent.”117 Anglo’s influence did not remain in South Africa but spread 
globally with mining and other operations in countries all over the world and it is believed 
that the success of the Anglo empire was as a result of Oppenheimer’s ability to correctly 
perceive the fundamental tendencies of the time.118 
Anglo since its inception has been a family business and Ernst Oppenheimer had brought in 
family members, such as his son, Harry Oppenheimer, to play a large role in the running of 
the company. Due to the size and influence of Anglo in South Africa, the Oppenheimer 
family was greatly involved in domestic politics and issues, specifically national issues 
affecting the economic health of the country and ultimately the ability of the company to 
operate sufficiently. Harry Oppenheimer during his time as Chairman appeared liberal 
regarding the political climate in the country, advocating apartheid reforms.119 He was verbal 
on his demands for the relaxation of the job colour bar120 and maximum wage for black 
miners, all of which were instituted by the government in order to protect white interests in 
the country. Oppenheimer was also of the opinion that economic growth, and not sanctions 
and economic pressure, was the key to ending apartheid. Known as the “Oppenheimer 
Thesis”, Harry advocated that as the South African economy developed and more of the 
black population were drawn into skilled jobs and the middle class, the apartheid policies 
would wither away.121 Oppenheimer was therefore of the opinion that letting the market work 
was important in the fight against apartheid and he was not a major supporter of international 
sanctions on the government and embargos on South African products in the 1970’s and 
1980’s. Oppenheimer also argued that disinvestment in South Africa ‘would only cause 
change by bringing about a state of despair amongst black people, which would lead, not to 
peaceful change, but to violent change.”122 The fact that the ANC was a major advocate of 
sanctions which it hoped would bring the South Africa government to its knees and force it to 
end apartheid put it at direct odds with the “Oppenheimer Thesis” and many black 
nationalists saw Anglo as the prime example of the evils of capitalism. The ANC also argued 
against Oppenheimer by pointing out that “South Africa’s most dramatic period of economic 
advancement between 1967 and 1976 was also a period during which more was done that at 
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any other time during our history to implement the worst features of apartheid.”123 However, 
as the situated continued to deteriorate in the 1980’s, this view of the future of South Africa 
changed and Anglo was advocating stronger ties with the ANC, particularly under the 
leadership of Gavin Relly, who succeeded Harry Oppenheimer as Anglo’s CEO, and took the 
step to meet with the ANC leadership in 1985.  
In the 1980’s, South Africa supplied two-thirds of the international gold market, making it an 
important area for gold mining companies. However, due to Anglo’s diversification into 
several other industries and shares in companies all over the world, gold was not the most 
profitable portfolio of Anglo at the time. Anglo’s diamond mining was more profitable; 
however, gold was still important within the Anglo empire and had made the company what 
it was. The company also didn’t want to lose access to South African gold or diamonds, or 
the numerous other sectors in which it played a major role. South Africa had for decades been 
the base of operations for Anglo and due to this significant investment, the company had a 
vested interest in the future of South Africa which would explain one of its reasons for 
reaching out and initiating a dialogue with the ANC in the 1980’s. It was not easy for a 
company the size of Anglo to simply pull out and leave decades of infrastructure and 
investment which made the empire such a formidable economic force.  
3.2) Context of the Anglo - ANC Meeting: 1985 
 
By 1980, the Nationalist government and its apartheid policies had been in place for over 30 
years and both the international and domestic resistance against the system was reaching a 
fever pitch. ‘In econometric studies, political instability has generally been found to reduce 
investment’124 and there were numerous factors that contributed to South Africa’s political 
instability and economic strain throughout the 1980’s and which eventually resulted in 
negotiations for peace between the state and the ANC. None of these factors worked 
independently and without any one of them the situation in South Africa in the early 1990’s 
may have turned out very differently. It was not only the government and the general 
population in South Africa that were being affected. Many corporations, based both 
nationally and abroad, were taking financial strain and were being pressured to denounce 
apartheid and break ties with the country until the racial segregation and subsequent political 
                                                
123Ibid, 96. 
124Elisabeth Jean Wood, Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transition in South Africa and El 











Page | 39  
 
instability had been resolved. It was under this pressure that the Anglo executives decided to 
make contact with the ANC. This chapter will therefore look at the factor conditions that put 
pressure on the private sector and particularly the gold mining industry and under which the 
corporation made its decision to engage in talks with the ANC in September 1985.  
3.2.1) The Domestic Armed Struggle 
Even before the formation of the South African Union and before the NP came into power in 
1948, black South Africans had begun to publicly show their unhappiness with the economic 
segregation between blacks and whites, specifically on the gold mines of the Witwatersrand. 
Labour strikes and protests occurred, although these had little effect when going up against 
the industrial machine that was the gold mining industry. In 1912, a group of middle class 
black South Africans formed the ANC, with the intension of drawing attention to the struggle 
of black South Africans.125 From its formation the ANC was dedicated to equal rights and 
equal representation between all South Africans, as well as democracy for the country.126 An 
important step for the future relationship between the ANC and the big businesses operating 
in South Africa was the ANC’s collaboration and cooperation between the SACP. The SACP 
began to work with the ANC in 1928 ‘after deciding that a nationalist democratic revolution 
to found an “independent native republic” would be the necessary first phase of the transition 
from colonialism to socialism.’127 It was this long standing relationship between the SACP 
and the ANC which led to fears by big business that leadership under the ANC at any point in 
the future would have communist undertones and would involve a great deal of nationalism, 
particularly for the gold mines which was one of  the country’s most productive industry.  
Once the NP came into power in 1948 and the apartheid policies began to be implemented on 
a grand scale, the ANC under new leadership, including Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu and 
Nelson Mandela, conducted a series of defiance campaigns which included work stoppages, 
non-cooperation and union action, in an effort to force the Nationalist government to reform 
the apartheid laws. These efforts by the ANC, along with other anti-apartheid organisations 
such as the SACP, the Pan-African Congress (PAC), an off shoot of the ANC, and the 
Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) resulted in years of civil disobedience, 
demonstrations and riots, which led to violence between supporters and members of the 
organisations and the government’s security forces. The Unlawful Organisations Act passed 
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by the state in 1961 banned all activities of the ANC and the PAC128 and from then on both 
organisations conducted their activities underground in South Africa or in exile in 
sympathetic countries. For many years and up to the beginning of negotiations in 1990 the 
ANC headquarters and base of operations was in Lusaka, Zambia, with offices also being 
established in London and Mozambique. Even with these banning’s, the activities of the anti-
apartheid movements continued in South Africa, leading to thousands of detainments, arrests 
and deaths. Much of the top leadership of the ANC, including Nelson Mandela, spent most of 
their lifetime in prison, particularly on Robben Island which had been set aside as an isolated 
prison for political prisoners.  
The ANC founded its military branch, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in 1961,129 which focused 
on the armed struggle and the training of cadres in guerrilla and traditional war tactics and the 
use of weapons and explosives for the possibility of a civil war in South Africa in the future. 
The thinking behind the formation of MK was stated by Mandela in 1961; ‘it would be 
unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a 
time when the government met our peaceful demands with force.’130 The ANC had stood for 
peaceful resistance since its inceptions and throughout the years of violence against the 
government it advocated its distaste for violence, but viewed it as a necessity to get the 
government to capitulate and dismantle its racist policies. They were meeting force with 
force. MK training camps were located in Angola and many cadres were also sent to Russia 
for training. MK conducted isolated bombings in the country, with 200 attacks occurring in 
the first 18 months of its existence. However, due to the arrest of a number of its top leaders, 
including Nelson Mandela, the effectiveness of MK was compromised from very early on. 
MK was particularly focused on military and government installations which they referred to 
as ‘hard targets’. However, civilians were also killed in sporadic bombings conducted in 
public areas such as shopping centres in white areas, activities which the ANC received 
international reprimand for. The ANC in the early 1980’s began encouraging its supporters in 
South Africa to rise up and revolt in order to ‘render South Africa ungovernable.131 Law and 
order by the mid 1980’s had broken down completely in the townships, with the state police 
unable to control the rising violence. “The country was engulfed by a black uprising that was 
more radical, more violent, more widespread and more sustained than anything witnessed in 















Page | 41  
 
modern South African history.”132 Some townships in the country were even identified by the 
government as “no-go areas”, places which were thought to be even too dangerous for the 
police to go into without military support.133 
As a result of this surge of violence, President Botha announced a nation-wide state of 
emergency in July 1985, which was summed up by Oliver Tambo as a tactic which ‘will 
sanction the killings of hundreds of people without police or others being asked to account 
for it.’134 Tambo continued by stating that a greater degree of repression produces a greater 
surge and that the state of emergency would move the conflict towards a real explosion in the 
country which would move beyond the townships.135 Tambo’s prediction was not far off and 
by the end of 1985 official state figures put the total number of politically related deaths that 
year at 763.136  As these were official figures, it is highly likely that the actual number of 
deaths could have been significantly higher that year but even the official numbers show that 
violence is the country was pervasive and widespread. The violence had also spread directly 
to the mining companies during this time with the Anglo American headquarters and the 
Anglo Vaal Buildings in Johannesburg being bombed in May 1985 after the companies 
dismissed 17,000 of its workers.137 By 1986 the number of MK attacks had tripled from 1983, 
with a total of 230 attacks in 1986, 80 percent of which the government claimed were against 
soft targets, which resulted in the death or injury of civilians.138 A poll taken in August 1985 
revealed that 63% of whites and 59% of blacks believed that apartheid would be over within 
the next ten years.139 Change was in the air and all sides, black and white South Africans, the 
ANC, Botha’s government and big business could feel that something was building. The 
question on most people’s minds was how it was all going to end – in compromise or civil 
war. By the mid 1980’s the ANC had become the embodiment of the tradition of liberation 
and the leading organisation in the struggle to overthrow apartheid and white minority power. 
It was due to this elevation in the hearts and minds of the majority of the South African 
population and the international community that both Gold Fields and Anglo saw it as an 
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imperative to meet and cooperate with them in their attempts to bring peace and democracy, 
and ultimately political and financial stability, to the country.  
3.2.2) The Financial Retreat 
Between 1983 and 1985, President Botha had made some reforms to the apartheid policies 
and political structure of the country in the hope of curtailing some of the international 
outrage and internal unrest which had built up in the late 1970’s, mostly since the Soweto 
Uprising in 1976 during which several students were killed at the hands of the police. A large 
number of these reforms were aimed at the South African business community which Botha 
knew was losing faith in apartheid due to financial difficulties. The Nationalist government 
needed the cooperation and support of business for numerous reasons. Politically, the support 
of business would increase the financial resources available to the National Party.140 Many of 
Botha’s policies required close cooperation with business if they were to succeed. One of his 
major goals was to centralise industry and to improve black education, housing and living 
conditions – tasks that needed private sector support as well as government funding.141 These 
improvements were token gestures made by the government in the hope of curtailing black 
resistance without having to actually giving in to the main demand, which was the end of 
apartheid and total racial equality under a democratic, one-man-one-vote political system. 
Botha was also concerned about growing international pressure against South Africa. Facing 
the threats of boycotts and sanctions, it was Botha’s belief that the national business sector 
would be important in portraying a strong and stable front and aid in boosting the economy to 
its former glory.142 The President also hoped that the South African business community 
would use its internatio al connection and influence to ensure continued foreign investment 
and flow of modern technology, all of which was needed to implement Botha’s strategy of 
strengthening the South African defence force against the anti-apartheid uprising. 143 
Although many businessmen supported Botha’s reforms in the early 1980’s,144 as the 
situation continued to deteriorate, with the majority of black, Coloured and Indian South 
Africans rejecting the token reforms such as the tricameral legislative system, which included 
the Indian and Coloured communities, but not black South Africans. This new constitution 
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sparked increased levels of anger as it indicated that Botha was in no way committed to 
ending apartheid and allowing all black South Africans to participate equally in national 
politics.145 As has already been discussed, the mid 1980’s saw a significant increase in 
violence and unrest in the country, to the point where it seemed that the government was 
losing its ability to maintain control, even by force. This violence saw a significant loss of 
confidence in South Africa as a good area for investment and resulted in serious of economic 
consequences which contributed too many businesses, including Anglo and Gold Fields, 
looking to the future and cooperation with the ANC.  
The Banks 
 
In 1985 South Africa was experiencing its worst economic crisis in 25 years. Investors had 
begun to pull out of the country in the late 1970’s and the increased wave of violence in the 
1980’s saw a renewed vigour to get out and by the end of 1984 many companies were in 
search of new, more stable markets to invest in. What was significantly concerning for the 
South government was the increase in white unemployment, ‘with white destitutes sitting in 
the streets in Johannesburg, and long queues of whites in the unemployment offices.’146 The 
apartheid system was designed to protect white workers and this high unemployment was a 
clear indicator that the economy, and apartheid, was failing not just black South Africans but 
the privileged minority as well. The first major blow to the South African economy came 
from the international financial institutions and in July 1985 the New York-based bank Chase 
Manhattan announced that it was stopping all loans to South African companies and was 
recalling all credit to the country as they came due, the bulk of which would need to be repaid 
within a year.147 The decision was stated by Chase Manhattan as being made on practical 
grounds, as an acknowledgment that South Africa was no longer a good investment or worth 
the hassle as the bank had received serious condemnation from the American public for 
continuing to supply loans to South Africa companies, which only accounted for less than 
one percent of its $87 billion assets. According to a Chase executive “We felt that the risk 
attached to political unrest and economic instability became too high for our investors. We 
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decided to withdraw. It was never the intention to facilitate change in South Africa; the 
decision was taken purely on account of what was in the interest of Chase and its assets.”148 
Pulling out of South Africa was not detrimental to Chase Manhattan but it was a major blow 
to the South African economy. The value of the rand plummeted following the decision and 
many other banks followed suit,149 mostly in the hope that if they got in early they could 
receive repayment before the companies went bankrupt, as most knew they would. One of the 
major influences on the American banks retreating from South Africa was also the threat of 
sanctions and according to Sampson “many politicians – particularly those opposed to 
government sanctions, including Reagan and Thatcher – would later point to the bankers’ 
withdrawal as part of the wisdom of the market-place making its own judgment on 
apartheid.”150 The ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations had been placing pressure on 
international corporations for years to become a part of the solution and stop being part of the 
problem. The resistance movement viewed companies which continued to do business with 
South African companies and the Nationalist government and continued to invest in the 
morally corrupt economy as contributing to the maintenance of apartheid. Gratitude to Chase 
Manhattan for its decision was received in the form of a letter written on a piece of toilet 
paper from a political prisoner in South Africa, thanking the bank for its actions against 
apartheid.151 In the wake of the withdrawal the value of the rand and the country’s foreign 
currency reserves, which included a significant amount of gold, continued to fall considerably 
and South African businesses were scrambling to get emergency loans from other banks 
(mostly European and Japanese) still lending in order to pay back the US banks.152 At the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) during this time it was said that even the white brokers 




Due to the political turmoil and violence in South Africa during the mid-1980’s, the 
international community hoped that President Botha would begin making significant political 
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reforms which would ease the economic crisis and allow South Africa to recover financially. 
These hopes were crushed on 15 August 1985 when Botha made his rather infamous 
‘Rubicon” speech which illustrated that although token reforms would be made, the status 
quo would remain the same and that a complete dismantling of apartheid and a move to a 
democratic ‘one-man-one-vote’ society, as demanded by the ANC and other anti-apartheid 
supporters, was not on the cards as he believed it would place the white South African 
minority at risk. Botha warned both local and international critics “do not push too far,”154 
responding to the increase in criticism of the apartheid policies in recent years. Botha’s 
speech saw a further loss in confidence in South Africa by international businesses and 
governments and further disinvestment resulted in the JSE being temporarily closed in late 
August of that year. The post-Rubicon speech environment also saw a renewed anti-apartheid 
vigour, both nationally and abroad, and it was at this point that many foreign governments 
began taking the idea of sanctions against South Africa more seriously. Many leaders up until 
then, despite the ANC’s disagreement, had argued that sanctions would not help the South 
African masses as the financial burden would be placed on them first as they had the least to 
lose to begin with, rather than white South Africans or the government.155 It would therefore 
take a longer period of sanctions to make the government feel the financial pinch enough to 
force it to make a change, which was the strategy behind the ANC’s call for increased 
economic sanctions and disinvestment.  
This was the opinion of the American president, Ronald Reagan, who in 1985 stated that 
“Our aim cannot be to punish South Africa with economic sanctions that would injure the 
very people we are trying to help.”156 However, in September 1985, the United States, 
followed by Japan, the United Kingdom under the leadership of Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher who had been a strong opponent of sanctions for many years, the European 
Community and the United Nations extended trade and investment sanctions to South Africa. 
These included bans on loans to the Nationalist government, the importing of Kruger Rands, 
iron and steel, exports of oil, petroleum, computers and arms to South Africa and the 
voluntary end to new investment by British companies in South Africa.157 Although these 
sanctions did not entail a complete ban on all trade and investment with the South African 
                                                
154Schrire, 83. 
155Charles Becker, The Impact of Sanctions on South Africa and the Periphery. African Studies 













Page | 46  
 
government, it was seen as a step in the right direction and was a ‘statement of determination 
and moral condemnation.’158 It is argued that the sanctions which were implemented did not 
have a major economic impact but it was a further sign of distrust in the South African 
market and the future of the economy under the current leadership, resulting in even more 
private companies beginning to move money and investments out of the country. 
3.2.3) Social Sentiment 
One of the factors influencing the increase of economic sanctions by international 
governments and the increased pressure on international governments, businesses and 
national businesses to stop doing business in South Africa came from a strong anti-apartheid 
sentiment that was building amongst ordinary citizens in the international community. In the 
early 1970’s there was a growing foreign awareness of the plight of black South Africans 
under the apartheid regime. Churches, particularly US-based churches such as the Protestant 
denominations, put pressure on American companies operating in South Africa to improve 
the conditions of their black workers and in 1980 the Protestant and Roman Catholic 
churches even threatened to disinvest in banks with ties to South Africa.159 It seems only right 
that the first international moral stands against an unjust system like apartheid would come 
from the institution said to embody human morality – the Church.  
Citizens of the international community were demanding a stronger stand against the 
injustices of apartheid and during the 1980’s, as the violence in the South African townships 
continued to rise, so too did the media coverage and international outrage at the 
circumstances in South Africa and the suffering of the majority of its population at the hands 
of the minority government. Numerous marches and protests occurred during the 1980’s in 
countries all over the world, some calling for increased sanctions by governments, for 
companies to cut ties with South African markets, and some even for the release of Nelson 
Mandela. Many companies, especially the American companies, which continued to do 
business with or supply to South African markets, were beginning to worry about their 
corporate reputations and the possibility of being boycotted by both civilians and 
governments. American companies ‘were much more self-conscious than most Europeans 
about their corporate images and standing, and about the role of capitalism in the developing 
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world.’160 Continued operations in South Africa could also impede the ability of corporations 
to do businesses in other African countries in the future if they were not seen to be anti-
apartheid and supporting the fight against racism and prejudice. This was a major 
consideration for Anglo which relied heavily on access to natural resources, of which the 
African continent has abundant supplies. During the 1980’s apartheid South Africa was 
becoming a real test of corporate morality and the concept of social responsibility and its was 
no longer just up to international governments to throw their hats in the apartheid ring, but 
the big multi-national and international companies like Anglo as well.  
All the above factors set the stage for the semi-official meeting between the ANC and the 
private sector executives in Zambia. It is under these conditions that both the ANC and Anglo 
decided that is was time to engage and talk about a new possible future for South Africa with 
the influence of the ANC as a legitimate political opposition.  
3.3) The Zambian Board Meeting 
 
Within the track-two meeting which occurred in Lusaka, Zambia on 13 September 1986, the 
Anglo executives acted as participants in the process. Zambian president Kenneth Kuanda 
acted as mediator but not in the traditional sense whereby he would have played a more 
active role in the process and would attempt to introduce discussions and steer the 
conversation where necessary. Rather, Kuanda was the conduit through which the meeting 
was organised due to his relationship with both the ANC leadership, which had been in exile 
and had its headquarters in his country for decades, and with Anglo which had diamond 
mining interests in Zambia and had been operating there for numerous years.161 Kuanda also 
provided the accommodated for the meeting at his presidential game lodge, Mfuwe, in 
Lusaka.162 Kuanda stayed at the meeting but the discussion was dominated and led by the 
participants themselves. The meeting had been requested by Relly, and was not attended or 
highly supported by Harry Oppenheimer, who remained involved in the company and had 
admitted that he was nervous about the meeting,163 possibly due to the expected repercussions 
from Botha. A larger group of businessmen had originally planned to attend the meeting with 
Relly, however, some dropped out when the plan of the meeting was leaked to President 
Botha. It was feared that Botha would disapprove of the meeting and punish those who 
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attended as the government forbade meetings with an organisation they labelled as 
“terrorists”; however, this did not turn out to be the case and Botha did not intervene. 
According to Relly, Botha was ‘cross, but not very cross’164  about the talks and did not 
attempt to stop the executives from flying to Lusaka as ‘seizing the passports of leading 
industrialists to whom the economy depended was politically risky.165 According to Tony 
Bloom, one of the executives present at the Lusaka meeting “we could be dismissed as 
politically naïve, but we ran large businesses – we couldn’t be accused of treason”.166 The 
value of the big businesses to the South African economy therefore allowed Anglo to conduct 
its meeting with the ANC relatively unimpeded by the government. The foreign ministry 
even sent the businessmen a briefing on the ANC, although it is likely that the briefing was 
subjective and portrayed the organisation from the government’s negative point of view. In 
the end the delegation consisted of Relly, Tony Bloom of Premier Group and Zach De Beer 
of Anglo, as well as members of the media, including Tertius Myburgh, editor of the Sunday 
Times, Harald Pakendorf, editor of Die Vaderland and Peter Sorour, Director of the South 
African Foundation.167 They met with the ANC delegation which consisted of Oliver Tambo, 
Pallo Jordan, Mac Maharaj, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki and James Stuart.168 
The meeting was intentionally held in an informal setting in the hope that this would decrease 
tension and facilitate an environment of open discussion about the challenges facing South 
Africa, both present and in the future. It was also emphasised that no decisions could be made 
at the meeting, but rather that the focus was ‘mutual learning and exploring common 
ground.’169 The meeting lasted six hours and was described by the Anglo delegates as having 
a friendly atmosphere, with the participants even referring to each other by their first 
names.170 Relly later described the meeting as one of the nicest days and as ‘a picnic among 
South African’s talking about their future together.’171 An ANC memorandum written on 14 
September 1985 about the meeting with businessmen described the atmosphere that day as 
‘cordial’,172 indicating that the organisation may not have felt as comfortable as the Anglo 
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executives were and may not have been as pleased with the outcome of the meeting or that 
the real mood was possibly exaggerated by the Anglo delegates or reported back to the media 
as so.  
3.4) Anglo’s Angle 
 
The motivation for the meeting by the Anglo businessmen was clear; South Africa was 
suffering economically from international sanctions and a lack of investment due to the 
political unrest which had increased significantly in the 1980’s. The majority of corporations 
operating in South Africa acknowledged that apartheid was not working and a peaceful 
solution involving the ANC was an appealing option. Therefore, much of the discussion at 
the Lusaka meeting centred around the ANC’s vision for the economic future of South Africa 
under leadership of the ANC and specifically on its views of state control and the 
nationalisation of industry.173 
During the 1980’s, the international business community was under pressure, both financially 
and morally, to break ties with South Africa and domestic companies were encouraged by the 
anti-apartheid organisations and the international community to stop doing business with the 
government, which was seen as helping to finance and therefore maintain apartheid. The 
ANC had implored businesses for years to become a part of the solution and begin 
disinvesting in the country in order to place economic pressure on the government. It was 
believed that under the real threat of an economic meltdown the government would see no 
other choice than to capitulate to the people’s demands for a democratic political process and 
the end of apartheid. For years many companies operating in South Africa had benefited from 
cheap labour supplied by the Nationalist Parties segregation policies; however, now that 
international condemnation was mounting, its became more and more difficult for companies 
to justify doing business with the South African government. Many businesses, especially the 
financial institutions, simply pulled out of the country all together, seeing its ties to the 
country as no longer being worth the hassle due to the unstable economic climate and hostile 
social sentiment within the international community.  
However, some companies, such as Anglo, decided to stay and try to improve conditions 
from within rather than becoming uninvolved bystanders. Gavin Relly in his paper entitled 
“The Cost of Disinvestment”, published in 1986, argued that South Africa is not a country for 
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the faint hearted and that the easy option when business is faced with lean times is to 
withdrawal, whereas greater participation is a harder road to walk.174 However, it must be 
remembered that Anglo is a business, and like any other business, it has to look after its 
shareholders and make a profit. So the question is, if doing business had become such a 
costly and difficult task, why did some companies such as Anglo and Gold Fields chose to 
stay, and not only that, chose to get directly involved by reaching out to the ANC in exile. It 
would be optimistic and naïve to assume that they acted only on moral grounds, that their 
actions were purely benevolent. Anglo in the 1980’s was one of the biggest mining 
companies in the world and a survey conducted in 1985 showed that Anglo, along with its 
numerous subsidiary companies, controlled 54% of the JSE and therefore dominated the 
South African economy, although Anglo did refute this statistic.175 Companies of this size 
and success do not make decisions on purely emotional or moral grounds, although it can be 
argued that taking the moral high ground may have been one of many factors.  This chapter 
will therefore explore the reasoning’s and motivations behind why Anglo chose to intervene 
and reach out to the ANC and what they hoped to achieve by doing so.  
All the factors that were mentioned above; the domestic armed struggle, the fall of the gold 
price, disinvestment and the increase of sanctions, as well as the increasing international 
condemnation of the apartheid regime, resulted in it becoming obvious that businesses would 
have to coordinate their own political initiatives in order to put pressure on the government to 
end apartheid and negotiate with the ANC.176 For many years the mining companies had a 
mutual understanding with the South African government, although there had been issues 
along the way which caused friction. Many companies understood the parameters of 
apartheid and had learnt to do business within these parameters while still making a profit, 
specifically a large profit in the gold mining industry. This had resulted in very little need by 
companies to demanded massive changes. However, as apartheid began to impede there 
operations, businesses realised that they could no longer make apartheid work financially and 
it became obvious during Botha’s Rubicon speech in August 1985 that the Nationalist 
government was not going to make the reforms needed to bring the country any political or 
financial reprieve. Due to this loss of confidence in the government, businesses like Anglo 
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had to make a move towards positive change and this involved the ANC, which had been 
identified as having the largest support from the South African black, Coloured and Indian 
communities, as well as significant liberal white support. The trip to Lusaka occurred just 
under a month after Botha’s disappointing speech.  
The Lusaka trek made by the Anglo executives was in essence a fact finding mission. Anglo 
wanted to get to know the ANC and its economic views in order to strategise how the 
company was going to function in post-apartheid South Africa. The ANC had been portrayed 
for years by the Nationalist government and the South African media as communist terrorists 
who wanted to destroy the country and seek revenge on the white population for years of 
segregation and oppression. Although the ANC was portrayed in a more positive light 
internationally, the organisation was still shrouded in mystery. Relly and the Anglo 
executives, as well as other business leaders, had acknowledged by the mid 1980’s that “only 
a process of negotiations with truly influential black leaders on issues of political power will 
make possible the final transition to a post-apartheid society.”177 Relly had identified the 
ANC as these truly influential black leaders and reaching out to the ANC, the possible future 
leaders of South African, was Anglo’s way of getting a clear understanding of who the ANC 
leadership were and what they stood for, as well as what their views are for a post-apartheid 
society, specifically from an economic point of view, which was their biggest concern. 
During this turbulent time Anglo needed to focus on the health of the economy in post-
apartheid South Africa, as if this was not a possibility then they would have to rethink their 
corporate strategies for the future and where South Africa fitted in. Those companies, such as 
mining companies, which couldn’t just disinvest and pull out due to investment in expensive 
infrastructure already in the country, and had according to Sampson ‘a massive stake in the 
country’s future, whatever its government.’178 The Anglo executives were therefore required 
to think longer term and were concerned about the damage being done by extended sanctions 
and loss of international investment which could be detrimental to the country once apartheid 
was abolished and it became time to rebuild.179 
The main source of information gained by the business community regarding the economic 
views of the ANC during the struggle against apartheid was from the Freedom Charter which 
was adopted by the organisation in June 1955. The Charter advocated a degree of 
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nationalism, particularly regarding the mineral wealth of the country, and stated that “the 
mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the 
ownership of the people as a whole.”180 In the mid 1970’s Anglo faced the nationalisation of 
the majority of their mines in Zambia and it was a major fear of mining companies operating 
in South Africa, and particularly Anglo, that the ANC would do the same thing if they were 
to gain power.181 It was this concern surrounding the possibility of nationalism of its large 
number of mines in South Africa that contributed to Anglo’s meeting with the ANC. Anglo’s 
position on nationalism was that it was detrimental, and even destructive to a country’s 
economic performance and growth and according to Relly; “Whatever one’s political 
persuasion, one lesson from the first 25 years of independence in African countries has been 
absolutely clear: Massive state intervention in the economy, through the creation of parastatal 
enterprises, and through the building of vast bureaucracies that ignore the interest of 
agriculture and the bulk population has been uniformly disastrous.182 Relly used the examples 
of Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia as countries which had moved away from nationalism 
towards promoting its private sectors after seeing the detrimental results it had on their 
economies.183 A discussion about nationalism was therefore high on the agenda for Anglo at 
its meeting with the ANC, with the delegates outlining their belief that free market enterprise 
was the best option for the post-apartheid economy. They stated that “political progress 
depended on economic growth, which capitalism would most effectively produce.184 Anglo 
argued that the discouragement of nationalism and promoting a free market enterprise in 
South Africa would be beneficial to the post-apartheid economy and political restructuring, as 
well as for the private sector. Anglo raised the possibility that nationalism would damage the 
post-apartheid economy’s ability to rebuild and develop as continued competition in the 
international economy is incompatible with nationalism, especially in organisations where 
efficiency is paramount.185 A challenge to South Africa’s position in the international 
economy would therefore not be financially beneficial to the majority of the population, a 
promise which had been made by the ANC throughout its anti-apartheid campaign. Anglo 
therefore made the point that nationalism would be detrimental to both sides.  With regard to 
                                                
180Ibid, 144. 

















Page | 53  
 
the concept of nationalism, Oliver Tambo stated that some of the major corporations would 
have to be taken under state control “as they represent tremendous wealth in the midst of 
unspeakable poverty.”186 However, he did acknowledge that the ANC did consider the 
concept of a mixed economy in post-apartheid South Africa to be a viable option, as opposed 
to a nationalism response. 
Although there were businessmen who made vague attempts to make contact with the ANC 
before 1985,187 Anglo has been highlighted by analysts as being the first major company to 
seriously reach out to the ANC in exile and ‘struck a clever blow for capitalism when it 
became the first to break the taboo against talks with the ANC.’188 For many black South 
African’s Anglo was the Poster Child for white supremacy and wealth in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, the epitome of ‘monopoly capitalism’, which has historically been associated with 
black oppression and the apartheid government.189 For decades the private sector, and more 
specifically the gold mining industry, had collaborated with the apartheid government in 
order to optimise profits for mining companies and therefore increase exportation and foreign 
investment in the country which was beneficial for the economy. It was, after all, the gold 
mining industry that had built the South African economy into a global powerhouse and a 
dominant force on the international gold market. However, this collaboration was not 
beneficial for all South Africans and resulted in numerous negative social and political 
ramifications, the worst of which was the legacy of separate development and racial 
segregation which was present on the Transvaal gold mines. According to Merle Lipton, the 
high demand of the gold mines for cheap, unskilled black labour resulted in the mine owner 
supporting “some major aspects of apartheid, particularly measures which enlarged the 
supply of cheap, unskilled, black labour and ensured its docility.”190 Progress towards the 
deterioration of apartheid policies was slower on the gold mines than in any other sector of 
the South African economy and it was only towards the late 1970’s and 1980’s that major 
changes were made across the board.191 It is possibly the number of years that these policies 
had been entrenched in the gold mining industry, as well as the benefits that some of the 
policies had on mining productivity, that resulted in this slow move towards de-racialism and 
a fair labour environment. The eventual move to a more liberal apartheid, or neo-apartheid 
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system, on the mines was mainly due to changes in the environment, both nationally and 
internationally, which made certain laws expensive and no longer beneficial to the mining 
companies. There was a maximum average set for black wages within the mining sector and 
the government imposed fines on any mining companies which exceeded the set amount.192 
This initially allowed the mines to keep wage costs low and employ larger numbers of 
unskilled labour in order to maximise productivity and increase profits.  
This was particularly effective in the early years of the industry when mining was more 
labour intensive. Low wages allowed the government to keep black earnings low so as to 
keep them within the unskilled and semi-skilled labour pool and dependent on the mines for 
employment rather than moving into the cities with their families to find work which was not 
desired. The aim was to keep the majority of the local black population in the separate 
Bantustans, or homelands, where they would live with their families and mostly farm, with 
the men travelling to the mines on a migratory basis in order t  earn a salary. This was 
achieved with the Group Areas Act, also referred to as the Native Act, originally instituted in 
1924, which controlled the influx of black South Africans into the urban areas.193 The men 
were housed in compounds on the mines and were not allowed to bring their families and the 
salaries were not high enough for entire families to relocate to the urban areas. Therefore, the 
separate development and segregation of blacks in rural areas and whites in the more urban 
and semi-urban areas was implemented to the benefit of the mining companies and the 
government and these homelands ‘under the dynamics of South African gold mining had long 
since become impoverished labour reserves’.194 The mine workers were issued passes which 
gave them permission to live and work in the mining areas. Passes were required to be carried 
at all times and were a form of movement control by the government. The pass law was first 
implemented in the Transvaal Republic in 1895 and was originally drafted by the Chamber of 
Mines as a way to put ‘a hold on the native’.195 The Chamber of Mines represented the seven 
leading mining companies in South Africa at the time and was established in order to 
coordinate policy.196 
However, there were times when this collaboration between the government and the mining 
companies for economic gains became strained. One contentious policy which caused 
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animosity was the job colour bar, implemented on the mines in the Transvaal Republic in 
1893.197 The job bar was the Republics method of ensuring that there was always 
employment for white South Africans on the mines by forcing the mine companies to employ 
a certain ratio of white to black labourers. Although this ratio varied over the years, it began 
at one white mine worker to every eight black miners.198 The wages for white mine workers 
were set significantly higher than their black counterparts, making compliance with the job 
colour bar expensive for the mining companies and in many cases white miners were 
employed and paid more to do jobs that black miners could do for a fraction of the cost. 
According to Lipton, the mining sectors opposition to the bar was first noted by the Chamber 
of Mines in 1893, ‘arguing that a test for miners should be based on competence not 
colour.’199 As gold prices fluctuated and industrial improvements occurred, the colour bar 
became a major hindrance to mining productivity; however, pressure for the government to 
eliminate the bar failed, mostly due to pressure from the white Mine Workers Union (MWU) 
which viewed the employment of white South Africans as being in jeopardy. In 1948, the 
Nationalist government tightened the colour bar200 and even in the 1960’s when the mining 
sector was in decline and many companies were facing the closing of many of their mines, 
the government was unwilling to allow skilled black miners to work in managerial positions 
and continued to impose fines on those mines which allowed black miners to do activities put 
aside for white employees.  
Another issue which resulted in significant tension in the 1970’s and 80’s was the maximum 
average wage set for black miners. Although keeping wages low was beneficial to mining 
companies in the early part of the 20th century, certain factors affecting the labour supply 
resulted in the mines needing to increase black wages in order to attract South African 
workers. The high demand for labour in the past had caused the mines to focus on 
recruitment from outside the country, and within the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), all countries except Mauritius, the Seychelles and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo had supplied labour to the South African gold mining industry.201 
According to Lipton, by 1970 over 80 percent of black mine workers in South Africa were 
foreigners.202 However, a series of mining riots between 1973 and 1975, the death of seventy-
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two Malawian miners in a plane crash in 1974 and the change to independent democratic 
leadership in Mozambique and Angola which limited the number of recruits to the South 
African mines.203 All of these factors resulted in a labour crisis on the mines and a renewed 
focus on the South Africa population for the industry’s vast labour requirements. Malawi 
alone had provided 30% of mining labour up to this point and after the plane crash the 
Malawian president has stopped all new recruiting and the renewal of labour contracts.204 
Negative connotations associated with mine working conditions and the low wages made 
recruitment within South Africa, particularly when competing with other local industries such 
as manufacturing and agriculture, difficult. The mining companies advocated a dramatic 
increase in wages which the government eventually allowed due to the major threat to the 
mining sector caused by the labour shortage. These wage increases were highly effective and 
during the 1970’s employment of South African miners had increased to 333,000 men.205 
It was this complex relationship between the state and the mining companies and years of 
close collaboration for mutual gains that built the negative perception of the mining sector, 
including Anglo, by black South Africans. They were seen as having colluded with the 
nationalist government to create the racist system under which they had suffered for so many 
years. Large mining corporations were associated with capitalist greed and racial prejudice 
and were therefore an enemy of the anti-apartheid movement and the ANC. Even as the 
relationships between the mining companies and the government, as well as the mining 
companies and black workers began to change and many international companies began to 
re-evaluate their positions on South Africa politics, as well as what role their companies 
could play in South Africa’s future, this was viewed by many black South Africans as too 
little too late, particularly for the mining companies who had profited from the system for so 
long. Relly was aware of this negative image which had been cultivated over decades of 
highly profitable and socially damaging operations in South Africa and stated that ‘as a very 
large company, Anglo America naturally has a capitalist label hung around its neck.”206 Due 
to this negative image, Relly acknowledged that the company “would have to fundamentally 
change to make the company acceptable to the future black or partially black, 
government.”207 By being one of the first major companies to reach out to the ANC, Relly 
saw a way of mitigating against this negative image and show that the corporation was on the 
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side of justice and a democratic South African future. As the ANC was the largest and most 
supported organisation within the anti-apartheid struggle, this was a calculated move to build 
a more positive imagine with the majority of the country, as well as the ANC leaders, many 
of whom at that point could possibly be the next leaders of the country.  
Many of the discussions and points made by Anglo at the meeting in Zambia also indicated 
that a positive relationship between the ANC and Anglo would be beneficial to the 
organisation and the future of a politically and economically stable South Africa. Much of the 
arguments made by the Anglo representatives against nationalism were made not only for the 
sake of Anglo but the post-apartheid economy as well. It was also not in the ANC’s best 
interest to lose the country’s biggest employer and exporter, which would be seriously 
detrimental to the economy and would hinder the ANC’s ability to deliver on the promises 
made to poor black South Africans during the years of struggle. The people were expecting 
freedom, as well as significant economic improvement and inheriting a crippled economy 
with no big international corporations operating in it, especially corporations of the size and 
with the international support and market as Anglo, would make the political transition 
slower and significantly more difficult. A large portion of the private sector wanted a change 
away from the current system and approached the ANC not because they were necessarily the 
best option for the country or their businesses based on policy, but that they had the largest 
support base. They were in essence backing the horse with the best odds. The ANC was 
viewed as having the greatest chance of winning, and Anglo therefore made a calculated 
move to get on their good side early and while they were still looking for private sector 
support, in the hope that this would benefit their ability to do business in South Africa in the 
future.  
3.5) Opening the Floodgates to Lusaka 
 
The Anglo executive’s trip to Lusaka in 1985 was the first major step in the business 
community reaching out to the ANC and as a result transformed the organisation into a 
legitimate opposition party and a player in South Africa’s domestic politics, rather than a 
guerrilla army focused on civil war. The motivations behind this move by Gavin Relly as 
well as what was discussed at these meetings has already been looked at in this paper. This 
section will now explore the effect this meeting had on the ANC and the process of official 
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Through the meeting with Anglo ‘the ANC was banking on the fact that, once it persuaded 
Anglo its money would be safe in the new South Africa, Anglo executives would return home 
as powerful ambassadors for change’208 within the domestic and international business 
communities. Meeting with Anglo was a risky move on the part of the ANC as they ran the 
risk of being accused by its supporters of selling out to the capitalists. However, Tambo and 
the other leaders identified the benefits of having the support and cooperation of one of the 
biggest South African exporters and employers on their side. At the ANC strategy conference 
held in Kabwe, Zambia in 1985, before the meeting with the Anglo executives took place, the 
organisations leadership had identified the importance of winning over white support as they 
believed that many white South Africa’s were looking for a way out of apartheid’s crisis.209 
The ANC’s strategy in 1985 was therefore to reach out and form strong alliances with liberal 
members of the white South African community and the meeting with Anglo was a perfect 
starting point given Anglo’s economic strength and influence both nationally and abroad. It 
also allowed for an open discussion about the ANC’s economic policies and plans for the 
future of the country in a non-threatening environment and to people who were highly 
regarded and influential within the private sector, which Gavin Relly and the other Anglo 
executives were.  
The Anglo meeting in Lusaka is described as having opened the flood gates to the ANC by 
the private sector210 and succeeded in ‘establishing a relationship between the wealth-
producing sector and a new African economic policy.’211 Through report backs by the Anglo 
executives, the ANC had been humanised and it showed that they were approachable and 
willing to discuss corporate fears and concerns about the future and the ANC economic 
views. The businessme  were also encouraged by the lack of retribution from President 
Botha who had been aware of the Anglo meeting in Lusaka but had made no attempts to stop 
it such as confiscating passports to stop South African citizens from travelling. The fear of 
the government lashing out at members of the private sector that reached out to the 
organisation had been a strong deterrent. Many South Africa businesses could not risk 
retribution from the government, which may have included embargos and the cancelling of 
government contracts. Now that companies and individuals who met with the ANC no longer 
had a target on their backs they were more confident in meeting with the leadership to discuss 
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economic issues and the possible financial future of the country with the ANC playing a 
legitimate political role. The Anglo executives in September were also accompanied by 
representatives of the media who also published information regarding the meeting in the 
Sunday Times, Die Vaderland and Leadership SA. This allowed the public to gain a better 
understanding of the ANC and its views on the current crisis and the future of the 
country.212It was not only members of the private sector but also national non-government 
organisations, university groups and even religious groups such as members of South African 
churches which followed the Anglo lead and met with the exiled leadership. The ANC had 
truly been brought into the fold and were being embraced by numerous organisations. 
Significantly, it also paved the way for the Dakar Conference which was held in the 
Senegalese capital in 1987. In Dakar 61 Afrikaans-speaking intellectuals and 17 ANC 
officials met for three days of talks.213 Many of the Afrikaans delegation were members of 
the South African parliament within the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) as well as members 
of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative to South Africa (Idasa) which had been 
established by PFP leaders Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and Alex Boraine.214 Both men left 
parliament to create Idasa and led the Dakar delegation. Although Idasa was seen to be non-
politically aligned organisation, many of its members where connected to the United 
Democratic Front and other anti-apartheid organisations, as well as the opposition PFP in 
South Africa. The Dakar Conference indicated once again the willingness of white South 
Africans and the ANC to engage in dialogue and support negotiations, which were conducted 
on an unofficial basis, allowing for a more open discussion with less political ramifications 
for both sides. It also meant that no concrete decisions or agreements could be made; the 
meeting was purely aimed at exploration and understanding of the realities of the ANC and 
apartheid South Africa and the possible future without any pressure to make or commit to any 
changes. What was most significant about the Dakar Conference was the discussion between 
ANC leaders and South African parliamentary members from the apartheid government, who 
were members of the white opposition. The Lusaka meeting therefore opened up doors to 
future track-two processes, including several members of the South African population and 
not only the private sector.  
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With the knowledge that they had the support of the major South African capitalist 
companies and their position in the apartheid struggle and in the future of the country was 
acknowledged by the private sector, the backbone of the economy. The ANC had an 
increased confidence in its position and hope of seeing significant change in South Africa. 
The business sector switching sides and playing a more direct role in change in the country 
also showed that its strategy of placing pressure on the private sector to distance itself from 
the apartheid regime and of placing financial strain through international sanctions on the 
government may possibly pay off as Botha was already losing the confidence of the 
international and domestic corporations which had helped to develop the economy for 
decades. In the mid 1980’s, one of the important components of the ANC strategy was to 
form a broad alliance of businessmen215 and accepting a meeting with the Anglo executives 
was the first step in implementing that vital strategy.  
3.6) Anglo-ANC Assessment 
 
As has already been discussed, the meeting in Zambia between the Anglo businessmen and 
ANC representatives had a significant impact on the road to abolishing apartheid as it opened 
the flood gates to Lusaka. Following the meeting, many other corporations and organisations 
and interested individuals, both nationally and internationally, took the initiative in reaching 
out to the ANC in exile and looked for ways to engage in a discussion with the organisation 
regarding its views and aim for South Africa, as well as assist in their struggle against the 
apartheid regime. This was a profound change in the nature of the ANC’s relationship with 
the private sector and white South Africans. However; what is important to this study is 
looking at the ways in which the role of the private sector, and specifically Anglo America, 
played in the success of this meeting and the consequences which the meetings caused, as 
well as the interests of Anglo in reaching out to the ANC.  
In September 1985, when the Anglo executives flew to Zambia, President Botha had been 
firmly against any private sector contact with the ANC, which was described as a terrorist 
organisation. As has previously been discussed, the Anglo businessmen did fear retribution 
from Botha to the point that some of the originally planned group dropped out. Botha had 
also not hesitated in the past to confiscate the passports of those he suspected were colluding 
with the ANC. However, what is interesting about this case, is that Botha reportedly knew 
about the planned meeting in September and did not attempt to stop Relly and the other 
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executives. Relly and Bloom theorise that the reason for Botha’s tacit acceptance of their 
meeting with the ANC was that it would have been politically risky to seize the passports of 
big businessmen. Bloom is even quoted as saying “we could be dismissed as politically naïve, 
but we ran large businesses – we couldn’t be accused of treason.”216 The strength of Anglo’s 
position in the South African economy therefore seems to have played a vital role in this 
meeting occurring at all. Yes, it is significant that Gavin Relly approached the ANC for a 
meeting, despite concern from even Oppenheimer himself, but the fact that the meeting 
happened at all points to the important position big business had in the political landscape of 
South Africa in the 1980’s. As has already been discussed, the country was under economic 
pressure during this period due to international sanctions and it would not have been 
financially or politically prudent for Botha to take action against a company as large and 
influential as Anglo America and its CEO. It can also be argued that other companies within 
the private sector saw the Anglo meeting with the ANC as a play for power and influence 
with the possible future leaders of the country and that the opening of the floodgates to 
Zambia was as much about reaching out to the ANC as it was about protecting their own 
future financial interests in the country.  
Had this been another type of organisation, rather than a company, or a smaller company, 
rather than Anglo America, this meeting may never have occurred, nor had such a significant 
impact on the political landscape and future of South Africa. However, a pivotal step in the 
process of the ending of apartheid was taken through the initiative of a large company which 
saw fit to reach out to the ANC despite the possibility of retribution. Although, what is also 
significant about Relly and Bloom’s comments regarding Botha’s lack of interference is that 
they seemed to have the confidence that Anglo’s economic status would protect them and this 
is arguably why they decided to act as they did, they saw an opportunity which other 
companies didn’t have and ran with it. The reasons why Anglo decided to reach out to the 
ANC would not be described as altruistic. As has been looked at in “Anglo’s Angle” earlier 
in this chapter, the company went to the meeting out of concern for their extensive economic 
investment in South Africa. As Gavin Relly discussed in his paper, the process of 
disinvestment would have been costly; however, given the economic and political climate, 
Anglo was forced to plan ahead and used the meeting with the ANC in Zambia as a fact-
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finding mission, a way to gage the organisation’s economic policies and try visualising a 
future for the company in an ANC-led South Africa.  
As has been outlined in this chapter, the Anglo meeting was the first step made by the private 
sector in switching alliances to the ANC and making definite steps in supporting the fight 
against apartheid and the move towards peace talks. Although the motivations by Anglo were 
not entirely altruistic and had a strong element of concern regarding the company’s financial 
future in South Africa, the consequences had a highly beneficial affect for the ANC and the 
transition process and had a butterfly effect regarding unofficial, informal talks with the 
ANC. The next chapter will examine the second phase in the South African case, the Mells 
Park talks which took place in England and were facilitated by Gold Fields. Chapter four 
includes the company’s long history in the South African business sector, specific details of 
the meetings, including participants and topics of discussion. The chapter includes with an 
exploration of Gold Fields motivations and the consequences of the meetings with relation to 




















Page | 63  
 
 
Chapter Four: The Mells Park Meetings, 1987 – 1990 
 
In 1987, Consolidated Gold Fields arranged the first in a series of clandestine meeting 
between a group of ANC senior delegates and prominent members of the South African 
Afrikaner community. The two sides were represented by Thabo Mbeki, believed to be 
Oliver Tambo’s right hand man and head of information for the ANC, and Willie Esterhuyse, 
a lecturer and respected academic at Stellenbosch University in the Western Cape. Michael 
Young, head of Gold Fields Communication and Corporate Affairs acted as mediator for the 
talks and handled the arrangements for the meetings, such as transport, accommodation and 
food for the participants. The first meeting, held on 31 October 1987 in Henley,217 England, 
was the first of many which took place on average every four months over a two year period 
at Mells Park, an estate near Bath owned by Gold Fields. The last meeting took place in 
February 1990, the same month in which the ANC was unbanned and Nelson Mandela was 
released from prison. Formal negotiations for democratic transition began later that year 
between the ANC and the Nationalist government. What this chapter does is explore the 
history of Gold Fields in the South African economy, details of the talks, including the people 
who were in attendance, what was on the agenda and how these meetings were perceived and 
informally supported by the apartheid government. The chapter ends with a detailed look at 
the motivations behind Gold Fields involvement in the Mells Park talks and most importantly 
the significant impact these secret talks had on the South African conflict and the move to 
formal peace talks.  
4.1) History of Gold Fields in the South African Economy 
 
Consolidated Gold Fields has a long history within South Africa’s private sector and can be 
attributed as one of the major players in sparking the countries industrial revolution which 
relied heavily on the gold mining sector in the late 1800’s. The company was co-founded by 
Sir Cecil John Rhodes in 1886, at the very start of the ‘Gold Rush’ in the Transvaal 
province.218 Rhodes arrived in South Africa in 1870 in the early years of the diamond 
discoveries in Kimberly. Rhodes staked a claim in Kimberly in October 1871 and formed a 
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partnership with Henry Rudd and together they initiated deep diamond mining in the 
Kimberly region, creating the original De Beers Consolidated Mines. De Beers Consolidated 
Mines had bought up the majority of the smaller mines and through these buy outs the 
diamond claims in Kimberly were reduced from 3,600 to 100.219 The Kimberly diamond 
industry, with its access to large amounts of capital from England, was established at the right 
time to take advantage of the gold discoveries in the Transvaal; “diamonds were the detonator 
which made possible the real industrial- mining explosion, based on gold.”220 The diamond 
houses, including De Beers Consolidated Mines, were perfect financial centres for the mining 
of gold and in 1886 Rhodes and Rudd moved to the Witwatersrand area of the Transvaal and 
began buying farms from the local communities, the majority of which were local Afrikaner 
farms.221 Gold Fields of South Africa Limited was registered in London on 9 February 1887 
of which Rhodes and Rudd were assigned Founders’ Shares.222 The British investors and 
shareholders were excited about the prospect of South African gold riches; however, the 
initial land on which Gold Fields began to mine did not have rich gold-bearing ore and profits 
in those early years were made from selling off interests in its estates and not from gold 
sales.223 In 1893, Gold Fields of South Africa invested in deep-level mining and through the 
amalgamation of Gold Fields of South Africa and three other companies, Consolidated 
Goldfields of South Africa Limited was formed.224 Through access to British finance, Gold 
Fields became the first real mining finance house and experienced great success in South 
Africa from its inception. The majority of the mines owned by Gold Fields were deep which 
were costly to run; however the significant amount of gold allowed the company to make 
large profits by being cost effective and spreading its risk among numerous mines and other 
areas and industries.225 
Gold Fields has a history of political intervention in South Africa. In the early years of the 
gold mining industry in Johannesburg there was significant tensions between the mining 
companies and the leadership of the then Transvaal Republic, led by President Paul Kruger 
and a small population of Afrikaner elite. The majority of the Transvaal population, which 
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resided mostly in Pretoria and Johannesburg, had made their way there from the Cape 
Colony, ruled by the British, during the Great Trek which began in the 1930’s.226 These 
settlers were adamant to avoid any influence from the British in their Transvaal and Orange 
Free State Republics and consequently both regions had gold in abundance. Therefore, from 
early on, the mine owners, many of which were wealthy British businessmen, such as Cecil 
John Rhodes, butted heads with Kruger’s government. Kruger was not against exploiting the 
mine owners for capital and imposed high taxes and obstructions which were to be used to 
continue his aim of building the supremacy of the Afrikaners in the Transvaal.227 The mine 
owners resented these difficulties while they were trying to build their businesses in the 
country; many had come from the Kimberly diamond mines and had not experienced 
obstacles like they did in the Transvaal.228 During this time, the British citizens living in the 
Transvaal, the majority of which were mine owners, were providing 90 percent of the 
Republics wealth but were considered to be “uitlanders”, or outsiders, and were denied the 
vote and any role in politics. According to Sampson, this tension between the mostly British 
mining companies and Kruger’s government reached a fever pitch in the 1890’s and resulted 
in the mine owners planning and financing an internal uprising, which was reportedly 
managed from the Gold Fields headquarters in Johannesburg.229 The armed raid which 
occurred in 1885 was aimed at taking over political control of Johannesburg for the British 
colony. The raid was led by Dr Leander Jameson and became known as the Jameson raid; a 
massive failure which brought embarrassment to the mine owners and Great Britain.230 
The mine owners, unwilling to allow their investments and profits, including their expected 
future profits, to suffer even after their defeat, found an ally in 1887 the new British High 
Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner. Milner’s aim was to create a united Southern Africa under 
British leadership and saw the coup of the Afrikaner leadership in the Transvaal as the first 
step. Kruger’s lack of cooperation resulted in the Second Boer War (also referred to as the 
South African War)  in 1899, a war which was significantly funded by the larger mining 
companies such as Gold Fields as they saw a change in political regime and British control of 
the Transvaal as good for business.231 Marxists commenting on the Anglo-Boer War in South 
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Africa refer to it as ‘a prime example of the power of international capitalism’232 and stated 
that ‘it will rank in history as a leading case of usurpation nationalism.’233 This war was one 
of the first modern large-scale examples of corporations involving themselves directly in 
international politics in order to improve their operating conditions and profitability, 
something which has become commonplace in the 20th Century throughout the world. The 
defeat of Kruger and the Transvaal leadership resulted in the formation of the Union of South 
Africa in 1910, bringing the British-led Cape and Natal Colonies and the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State republics under one rule. The Union was considered to be British territory 
but was under local rule and this new government was far more cooperative with the mining 
companies, cultivating a mutually beneficial working relationship for many years and 
allowing the industry to expand and become the largest gold producer in the world. This 
political cooperation continued after the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948 and it was 
only when the apartheid policies became a hindrance to business that Gold Fields once again 
stepped in and involved itself in the political future of the country, only this time it was not 
through war but secret dialogue.  
Despite further investments internationally throughout the 20th Century, Gold Fields 
continued to operate within the South African gold mining industry during the apartheid 
years and after decades of investment, the company had a vested interest in the success of the 
South African economy which was in turmoil in the 1980’s. It was this vested interest in the 
country’s future, as well as its highly profitable history with the country, that resulted in Gold 
Fields stepping in under the leadership of its CEO, Rudolph Agnew and involving itself in 
indirect and informal discussions between the ANC and members of the Afrikaner 
community in 1987.  
4.2) Context of the Mells Park Talks 
 
The context in which the Mells Park talks occurred was similar to those circumstances which 
led to the Anglo meeting with the ANC in 1985 as the meetings in England took place later, 
in 1987. South Africa was being challenged economically due to sanctions and embargos on 
national businesses and products. The majority of international banks were weary of loaning 
to the South African government and companies due to social sentiment which was strongly 
against the apartheid policies and there was no indication at that point that Botha was willing 
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to make any significant changes to appease the anti-apartheid masses who continued to use 
violence as a means of rebellion throughout the country, resulting in an indefinite state of 
emergency in 1986. The domestic violence was increasing, the economy was taking 
significant strain and although the ANC had indicated its willingness to reach and negotiate 
with the Nationalist government, at this point Botha had not given any open indication that he 
was ready to compromise and come to some sort of agreement with the ANC. 
4.3) The Way Forward 
 
Between 1987 and 1990 a series of twelve secret talks were held in England, with a meeting 
being held on average every four months.234 These meetings were attended by leaders of the 
ANC and Afrikaner academics from South Africa, the majority of which were held in Mells 
Park, an English estate owned by Gold Fields. During the two years of meetings Gold Fields 
acted in a mediatory role and not as a participant as the Anglo executives had been in 
Zambia. Michael Young had been approached by Oliver Tambo to arrange a meeting 
between the ANC and members of the South African Afrikaner community235 in the hope of 
gaining a better understanding of white thinking236 and white fears in South Africa which the 
ANC recognized would be a significant barrier to negotiations happening and the violence in 
the country finally coming to an end. Tambo’s request was in line with the strategy decided 
on at the ANC’s Kabwe Conference in 1985 which aimed to seduce the private sector and the 
more liberal white population away from the apartheid government with its policies and plans 
for a fair and democratic South African future. The fact that Tambo made this request of a 
Gold Fields employee indicated that he believed the company would have the connections in 
order to approach the right people, and would possibly have the ability to persuade them to 
meet with the ANC which would have been regarded as a highly risky move for any South 
African with any connection to the government. Tambo had a belief in Gold Fields and 
specifically in Michael Young’s ability to handle such a politically sensitive assignment, as 
well as a belief that he could succeed as these meetings were important in the ANC’s strategy 
to gain support of white South Africa through understanding and help them realise that the 
ANC wanted what’s best for the country and is ultimately their best hope for a peaceful South 
Africa in the future.  
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The first round of talks occurred at an English country inn near Henley, England from 31 
October to 01 November 1987. The original participants were Aziz Pahad, Wally Serote, 
Harold Wolpe and Tony Trew representing the ANC and Willie Breytenbach, Willie 
Esterhuyse and Sampie Terreblanche who were representatives of and well respected within 
the Afrikaner community, although they were not directly involved with the government and 
had been granted no official mandate from the Nationalist government.237  The participants in 
these meetings changed over the years as new participants were invited to join. In general, the 
meetings were led by Thabo Mbeki for the ANC and Willie Esterhuyse for the Afrikaner 
community. Esterhuyse was a lecturer at the University of Stellenbosch in the Western Cape 
and had links to President Botha and the South African government as he had once been a 
member of the Nationalist Party and the Broederbond, although he left both organisations in 
the mid 1980’s.238 The Broederbond at its inception was a secret organisation of Afrikaner 
nationals which opposed British dominance in South Africa; however, over the years the 
organisations support increased and aims changed dramatically and it became a strong 
supporter of the Nationalist Party and the apartheid ideals and principles. Esterhuyse also 
lectured Botha’s daughter at the university at one point during his years there.239 Members of 
the Afrikaans media and the Dutch Reformed Church were also in attendance at the Mells 
Park talks over the two year period, allowing for a wide scope of insight and opinion into the 
South African conflict and possible scenarios for the future.  
From the beginning it was emphasized by both sides that the meetings were not about 
negotiations240 and that neither side had been granted a mandate to make any decisions 
regarding peace talks in South Africa. Participants on both sides stated that they were 
attending the meetings in an unofficial capacity.241 There was also an initial focus on what 
preconditions on both sides were necessary before formal negotiations could begin and gain 
an understanding of what future would be acceptable to both sides.242 Perhaps the most 
important factor of the Mells Park talks was the indirect link that was created early on in the 
process between the ANC and President Botha through the communications of Esterhuyse 
and Dr Niel Barnard at the NIS. Esterhuyse had been approached by the NIS to report back to 
Barnard on the details of the talks which Esterhuyse agreed to do under the knowledge and 
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approval of the ANC delegates. This was the government’s way of gaining insight into the 
ANC and its views on important issues without formally entering into talks and risking its 
political support from conservatives who were strongly opposed to reforms within South 
Africa. The ANC understood the motivation behind reporting back to Botha as a way to 
obtain information on how the ANC would react to certain moves and reforms by the state, 
such as the release of political prisoners like Mandela and Govan Mbeki.243 The ANC also 
kept its participation in the England talks secret from its supporters in South Africa and some 
of its leadership, specifically the hard liners in MK who were convinced that the armed 
struggle was the way to end apartheid, not negotiations with the government. The more 
moderate ANC leadership feared that its cooperation in talks would cause rifts in the party 
and would be been seen as the ANC leadership selling out to the enemy.244 
At the same time that discussions were occurring in England, with information being reported 
directly back to Botha and Tambo, Barnard of the NIS was conducting parallel talks with 
Nelson Mandela while he was being held in Pollsmoor prison. Mandela, along with many 
other high profile political prisoners, had been transferred from Robben Island to Pollsmoor 
in 1985 and he was kept mostly in isolation from the rest of the ANC prisoners. While the 
government indirectly supported the talks at Mells Park, Barnard had a different angle and 
was implementing a strategy which involved the splintering of the ANC. Mandela had 
become an international icon for the struggle against apartheid and Botha did not want him to 
die in jail as this would increase his popularity as a martyr for the cause and could possibly 
escalate domestic outrage and violence.245 According to political analysts, the South African 
government knew that they would win some much needed popularity with the international 
community if they were to release Mandela; however, they did not want to look weak and 
lose support of the South African white conservatives who were still holding onto the 
apartheid ideals. Therefore, Mandela’s release would depend on him renouncing many of the 
ANC demands, such as the commitment to the armed struggle, majority rule and its close 
relationship and cooperation with the SACP.246 Due to Mandela’s isolation from the outside 
leaders of the organisation, he was not able to get up to date information on the Tambo’s 
plans and strategies and initially was not aware of the talks at Mells Park. The government 
hoped to use this lack of communication as a way of getting Mandela and Tambo to 
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contradict each other and possibly get Mandela to speak out against the ANC’s use of 
violence, resulting in a rift between the senior leadership. Botha also hoped that it would be 
easier to reason with Mandela after he had been in jail for so many years and could use his 
long awaited freedom as a bargaining chip.  
Numerous talks were held between Mandela and the minister of justice, Kobie Coetzee, with 
Niel Barnard also attending many of these meetings, which were held without the knowledge 
of supporters on either side. Through letters smuggled in and out the prison my Mandela’s 
lawyer, George Bizos, the leadership in exile and Mandela were able to enjoy some 
communication and Mandela assured them that any discussions he had with government 
officials which took place in the prison would adhere to the ANC policies and objectives and 
that he was committed to the same outcome as the leaders in Lusaka, which is what they were 
also working towards achieving at Mells Park. This move by Botha showed that the 
Nationalist government had accepted that a deal with the ANC would need to be reached at 
some point in order to solve the South Africa crisis; however, “the government’s top 
strategists were determined to make him (Mandela) drop or water down his commitment to at 
least one or two of the ANC’s basic tenets.”247 
The Mells Park talks had a broad scope and were divided into two phases – preconditions for 
negotiations and a discussion of specific positions and principles.248 The main discussions 
within these two phases were centred on the following questions:  
• At what point would the ANC agree to abandon the armed struggle in South Africa? 
• Was the ANC prepared to accept a multi-party democracy interim government to rule 
in the transition to full democracy? 
• Would a new constitution safeguard the rights of the white minority? 
• What was the ANC’s vision for the country’s economic future?249 
One of the first issues on the agenda was the release of high ranking political prisoners such 
as Govan Mbeki and Nelson Mandela. The ANC leadership advocated that they could not 
approach the negotiating table without many of its leaders who were still in prison250 and the 
government had previously demanded that the ANC renounce violence and end the armed 
struggle as a precondition to Mandela’s release, causing a stalemate. During the Mells Park 
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talks it was revealed by the white delegates that Botha would be willing to release Mandela, 
but on humanitarian grounds in order to save face after years of refusing their release as it 
would be viewed as violence against the government paying off, which would have been a 
dangerous precedent.251 The government wanted to know how the ANC would respond to the 
release of prisoners, if they would respond in a positive way towards negotiations and 
whether they would be able to control their supporters in the townships and prevent any 
further violence. The ANC did state that it would see the releases as a positive step and would 
reciprocate but that they would demand that the releases be made on political rather than 
humanitarian terms.252 Debates, sometimes heated debates, about these topics allowed for 
both sides to gain a better understanding of what would need to happen for negotiations to 
begin. The issue of violence and the continued attacks by MK in South Africa was a 
contentious issue which was greatly discussed, as well as the ANC’s views on why they 
continued to sanction violence in the country. The ANC stated that they did not want violence 
but would only stop its armed struggle once the Nationalist government stopped attacking its 
people and ended apartheid. However, in 1988 during one of the Mells Park meetings Mbeki 
stated that “the armed struggle would be stopped if the ANC was allowed to operate as a 
political party within South Africa – in other words, was unbanned.’253 This was the first time 
that the ANC had indicated to the government, indirectly through Esterhuyse, that they would 
halt the armed struggle without the full abolishment of apartheid. Although it took another 
two years for the ANC to eventually be unbanned by F.W de Klerk, this indication by the 
ANC that it was willing to negotiate and make concessions on key issues allowed the Mells 
Park participants and the government to see that common ground could be found and that the 
ANC was not blood thirsty and unrealistic. However, on the issue of a future democracy and 
one man one vote representation in South Africa the ANC was in no way flexible and it was a 
position they stuck to throughout the track-two dialogues and later during the official 
negotiation process with the government.  
A major shift in the South African crisis occurred in 1989. In the January of that year 
President Botha suffered a stroke and resigned as leader of the NP, although he continued in 
his role as president of the country for most of the year. F.W de Klerk was at this time the 
Minister of National Education and although he was not seen as the favourite to succeed 
Botha as president, he won the internal NP election and replaced Botha as leader of the party. 
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Tensions were high between Botha and de Klerk due to the division of power between the 
presidency and the party.254 An increase in tensions within parliament resulted in a boost in 
support for de Klerk and in August 1989 Botha officially resigned as president. In September 
1989 de Klerk was inaugurated as president and caused uncertainty within the ANC as to de 
Klerk’s view of the future of the country and official negotiations which had begun to seem 
like a possibility under Botha due to discussions at Mells Park and he even had a meeting 
with Mandela in July. De Klerk was known to be a conservative and had previously led the 
party in the Transvaal, which was viewed to be the most conservative and apartheid 
supporting province in the country. 
However, despite the ANC’s perception of De Klerk as a conservative and a hard liner, the 
ANC had a means of communication and understanding of his views through his brother 
from day one of his presidency. In August 1988 Willem (Wimpie) de Klerk attended his first 
meeting at Mells Park. At this point De Klerk was still a minister in Botha’s government and 
Botha had not yet had his stroke and it seemed that he would control the move of the state in 
its decisions regarding the ANC.  However, it is believed that Wimpie provided briefings to 
F.W from the August talks onwards so that even before he had become leader of the NP and 
president he already had an informal connection to the ANC leadership and a means through 
which to get information regarding their views on the country and their preconditions for 
change. The Mells Park meetings allowed de Klerk to know exactly where he stood with the 
ANC and their views on important political issue s before he was in a position of power. 
During the Mells Park meeting held between 21 and 24 April 1989, F.W de Klerk was the NP 
leader and possibly the next President of South Africa based on allegiances in parliament 
falling to de Klerk as well as Botha’s poor health. During this meeting Wimpie provided a 
vital communication link between both sides and asked the ANC delegates a series of 
questions which he stated had come directly for his brother. President de Klerk wanted to 
know whether it was possible to start talks about official negotiations, as well as what the 
ANC’s preconditions for the discussion would be, and what an acceptable agenda would 
be.255 It was the first time that de Klerk indicated his desire to conduct direct talks with the 
ANC and made a move towards a formal negotiation process and he used his brother and the 
Mells Park talks as the vehicle to relay the message, acknowledging the value of this direct 
link between the government and the ANC.  













Page | 73  
 
According to Harvey, the ANC delegates responded to De Klerk’s questions by saying that 
they were willing to go ahead with talks about talks immediately, that there would be no 
preconditions on their side and that De Klerk could set the agenda, although a discussion on 
practical matters would be a good focus.256 This was the break through which all the months 
of meetings and discussions at Mells Park had been about; they had succeeded in provided 
the pre-step for official peace talks and ultimately the end of apartheid. It also showed for the 
first time that both the ANC and the government were willing to make concessions to assist 
in the beginning of the negotiation process. The government for years had refused to talk to 
the ANC without an end to the armed struggle and the violence in the country. The 
government had not wanted to seem weak and that it had been strong armed by the domestic 
violence. On the other side, the ANC had stated that it was not willing to talk to the 
government in an official capacity until all anti-apartheid organisations had been unbanned 
and political prisoners such as Mandela had been released from prison. By agreeing to start 
the process of talks about the possibility of formal negotiations without fulfilling any 
preconditions, both sides had placed the discussion of peace talks above politics; however, 
there still remained major preconditions which would need to be agreed upon before the 
formal negotiations could finally begin. Two of these major preconditions were met in 
February 1990 when de Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and the release of 
Mandela. Talks about the possibility of starting formal talks were on the agenda and had been 
agreed to by both sides, but there was still a lot of work to be done. 
The fact that this breakthrough had been made possible through the efforts of one employee 
from a mining company, the epitome of capitalist greed and white wealth in South Africa for 
so many decades, made this an even more surprising victory. A testament to the emotional 
connections and relationships built at Mells Park is that Willie Esterhuyse acted as a special 
advisor to Thabo Mbeki during his time as South Africa’s president.  
4.4) Gold Fields Endgame 
 
Gold Fields, under the initiative of Michael Young, went about gaining the cooperation of the 
ANC with a more hands-on approach, by planning, financing and facilitating meetings with 
Afrikaner nationalists and not just members of the company. Gold Fields would have had 
similar concerns to Anglo regarding sanctions, disinvestment and nationalism in South Africa 
but instead of pleading its own case, it focused more on facilitating talks with adversaries in 
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the hope that initiating dialogue would result in political change in the country and ultimately 
lead to economic improvements that would benefit the company and allow for its continued 
operations in South Africa. Through meetings with the ANC Gold Fields was also learning 
about the organisations economic views, policies and plans for the future which would allow 
the company to strategise and make preparations for business operations in the future South 
Africa with inside information which other companies did not have.  
By helping the ANC by arranging talks with members of the Afrikaner community, Gold 
Fields also showed that the company was on the side of the ANC and was willing to take 
risks in order to help them, although this help was offered under clandestine circumstances, 
which were agreed to by both sides. Agnew gave Young the go ahead in 1987 to make 
contact with the ANC and try to organise the meetings but wanted to make sure that Young’s 
actions were kept secret from the shareholders who may not have supported the company 
being involved with a group some described as terrorists. There was also the risk of 
retribution from the South African government as Botha did not support any contact with the 
ANC which was a banned organisation. Through Young’s direct involvement, Gold Fields 
was endearing itself to and getting on the good side of the ANC who at that point were the 
possible future leaders of the country and it had already been indicated that they had support 
internationally and from other members of the private sector, including Anglo American. At 
the time when these talks were initiated there was no certainty that they would succeed or 
help in any way towards a move to formal negotiations; however, the possibility of a stable 
South African economy in which Gold Fields could continue to operate and profit from the 
countries mineral wealth would have made the risk worth it to them, particularly if secrecy 
allowed them to operate without the scrutiny of its shareholders or the media. Gold Fields at 
the point of its intervention was acting as a concerned third party and was looking to the 
security of their investment in South Africa as one of the largest mining companies in the 
country. 
4.5) Consequences of Mells Park 
 
The main aim of track-two dialogues is to build a bridge or create a relationship between 
members of adversarial groups in a non-threatening way by meeting unofficially on neutral 
ground and with no intention or pressure to negotiate or make deals, but rather to discuss 
issues and build an understanding. It is argued that these unofficial talks feed into and assist 
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understanding and sense that the enemy is human and can be cooperated with. Unofficial 
initiatives are therefore successful in so far as they contribute to changes in the political 
cultures on each side in ways that make the parties more receptive to negotiate.257 This 
chapter will explore if this was the case in the South African conflict and specifically what 
affect the conflict resolution initiatives at Mells Park had on the ANC’s policies and decisions 
regarding the future and the possibility of a peaceful resolution and negotiations with the 
Nationalist government. The aim of this chapter is identify how track-two diplomacy at Mells 
Park is attributed to bringing the ANC to the official negotiating table with the South African 
government. 
4.5.1) Opening the Door to Direct Contact 
Throughout the Mells Park meetings the ANC and the NIS were in essence engaged in a 
meeting within meeting.  Through report backs by Esterhuyse to Director Barnard at the NIS 
and from Mbeki to the presidential committee based at the ANC headquarters in Lusaka, an 
indirect, and more importantly, a deniable line of communication was opened between the 
top leadership on both sides.  According to Aziz Pahad, one of the ANC delegates “both sides 
understood that that the people we were talking to were listeners, who were reporting back to 
their home.”258 The point at which this indirect line of communication began to show results 
was in September 1989 when the NIS met with the ANC in a secret meeting in 
Switzerland.259 This meeting was arranged  through the Mells Park participants and was the 
first time that members of South Africa’s intelligence service, who had been spying on and 
sabotaging the ANC’s anti-apartheid operations for years, actually sat down to discuss the 
future with the ANC and it had been made possible through the valuable line of 
communication at Mells Park. 
4.5.2) Building a Sense of Possibility 
The meetings organised and mediated by Gold Fields in England between 1987 and 1990 
represented the first proximate talks between the ANC and the government. Although no 
official representatives of the government were participants in the talks, it was known on both 
sides and to Michael Young that Willie Esterhuyse was reporting back to the NIS in South 
Africa on the issues discussed at the meetings and that this information was being passed on 
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to President Botha by Barnard. Esterhuyse had agreed to these report backs on the condition 
that he informed the ANC delegates.260 Therefore, at Mells Park there was the situation that 
the ANC knew that Botha was receiving notes on the meetings and Botha knew that Mbeki 
knew of his arrangement with Esterhuyse and was reporting back to his leadership, 
particularly Oliver Tambo, in Lusaka. In essence, the Botha and Tambo were conducting a 
two year dialogue through the help of their emissaries, Esterhuyse and Mbeki.  
The ANC had been asking for discussions with the government for years but had never been 
in a position of power to get the government to agree. However, all domestic and 
international circumstances of the 1980’s were placing significant pressure on Botha to make 
radical steps towards change before the economy imploded or the country was torn apart by 
civil war. Years of failing to get the government to concede and agree to talks had also 
influenced the ANC strategy, with many leaders of the organisation, particularly those 
involved in MK, advocating violence, believing it to be the only viable option left and they 
would have to force the government to talk. Although there were leaders such as Oliver 
Tambo, Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela who still advocated negotiations and a peaceful 
revolution over violence, the South African people were growing impatient and frustrated 
with the lack of success over the years and even the moderates had begun to acknowledged 
that the armed struggle will be the only way to force the government into cooperation. In the 
1980’s as MK increased the number of attacks in the country and the black townships were 
rendered ungovernable by violence, the possibility of a civil war was on the minds of Botha 
and the ANC leadership, as well as the international community which was looking up and 
taking notice of the racist atrocities being committed in South Africa. The ANC had come 
under enormous pressure during this time, both nationally and abroad, to put a stop to the MK 
attacks and bring order back into the townships; however, they were committed to the official 
party line – the violence will stop when the government ends apartheid and stops attacking its 
people. It was believed that by making the country ungovernable, through armed insurgence 
and mass civil disobedience, Botha would have no choice but to capitulate.  
Although the moderate leaders had eventually faced the realities of the situation and 
acknowledged that violence may have a role to play in the struggle for freedom, these men 
did not relish violence and were in favour of talks and as Mandela had stated that for the 
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ANC ‘one of our strongest weapons is dialogue.’261 It was argued that ‘it was state violence 
and the closing of all other meaningful avenues of change, which made the armed struggle 
necessary.’262 These men saw the armed struggle as being forced on them by the government 
and with no other options, they could not back down and ‘abandon our people’s 
aspirations.’263 However, the secret Mells Park meetings had given rise to hope for the ANC 
moderates. For the first time, the government was engaging in indirect talks and was willing 
to listen, although not publicly due to political fears. According to Robert Harvey, the ANC 
saw this indirect communication as a splendid prize – the opportunity for the men who 
actively commanded the guerrillas to talk to the enemy.264 It was viewed as a positive step 
towards cooperation and the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the South African 
conflict.265 The moderate leaders therefore hoped that Botha would blink and agree to a 
formal conflict resolution process before the country was plunged into civil war. Although it 
took two years of talks at Mells Park before official negotiations began, the possibility 
allowed the ANC to start thinking about the ends and not just the means and begin planning 
for a negotiated settlement with the state.  
4.5.3) Understanding White Perceptions 
During the 1980’s one of the strategies of the moderates within the ANC was to win white 
South African support and convert them away from apartheid. According to Mbeki, the 
ANC’s aim was to win them away from apartheid, even if they don’t come to us.266 
Therefore, it did not matter if they didn’t become specifically ANC supporters, but rather that 
they rejected the need for apartheid and moved their allegiance away from the Nationalist 
Party.  ‘The decision to get under white South Africa’s skin – motivated by President Oliver 
Tambo, but carried out by Thabo Mbeki – was probably the most important one ever made by 
the exiled movement.’267 This meant that the ANC leadership needed to increase its 
interaction and development relationships with white South Africans in order to understand 
their perceptions of the organisation and their concerns about the future of the country and 
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the white minorities’ position in it if the ANC were to come into power. In many ways, it was 
fear that prevented many white South Africans from renouncing apartheid, and rather 
supported slight reforms which they believed would still protect them and their economic and 
social positions. For years, the state through the media had built a perception of the ANC as 
terrorists. The ANC had also helped build this perception with attacks by MK on soft targets 
in white areas which killed civilians and had heard about broadcasts on the ANC radio 
station, Radio Freedom, which called on black domestic servants to attack their white 
employers.268 This fear had benefited the government as they had continued to receive 
domestic support. Of course it must be noted that the ANC did have a white support base in 
South Africa and that not every white South African was under the perception that the ANC 
were terrorists. However, there was a significantly large portion of the white population that 
had serious concerns and misunderstandings of the organisation. As violence increased in the 
country, particularly in the 1980’s, so too did white fear of civil war as well as possible 
retribution from the black population on whites for the atrocities of apartheid. The ANC 
moderates took the view that they needed to understand white thinking in order to quell this 
fear of the future and assure the white population of their safety.  
By the ANC agreeing to meet with businessmen like the Anglo executives in Zambia and to 
participate in the Mells Park meetings arranged by Gold Fields and talk to members of the 
white South African population openly and honestly, the ANC bolstered its ability to get 
information about what the minority white population was concerned about regarding the 
ANC and how they could go about curbing these fears and get their support in the fight 
against apartheid. The ANC was in essence reaching out to possible allies, in the 
understanding that they could not get to the negotiating table alone. The only way of 
decreasing the fear of the unknown was through knowledge and understanding and to get rid 
of misperceptions. These meetings therefore built an emotional understanding and sense of 
reality between both sides and through these talks “South Africans met to lay the human 
foundations and erect the emotional buttresses for a lasting peace.”269 
4.5.4) Preparing for Official Peace Talks 
None of the political developments in South Africa in the 80’s happened in a vacuum. While 
the talks were being conducted in England between the ANC and white South Africans there 
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were also talks in Pollsmoor prison with Nelson Mandela, bombings by MK were occurring 
in the country, international pressure on the government from Western states to negotiate due 
to increases of violence, sanctions crippling the economy, internal politics between the 
National Party and the Conservative party, new leadership from P.W Botha to F.W de Klerk, 
the collapse of communist Russia and changes of leadership in neighbouring countries such 
as Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. All these factors had a collective role in 
placing pressure on both the ANC and the government to capitulate and were making 
negotiations look like a positive option in order to avoid further violence and an economic 
meltdown. The NP through the leadership of de Klerk had made his first indication to the 
ANC that it was being willing to enter into direct negotiations with the ANC. A discussion 
regarding timing and preconditions occurred between the ANC delegates present at Mells 
Park and Wimpie De Klerk, acting on behalf of his brother. It had become clear that the 
Nationalist Party wanted to talk and was open to a formal negotiation process in the near 
future. In response to this, the ANC saw the need to sharpen its principles and pre-negotiation 
demands so that it was ready when the time came to discuss their demands for an end to 
apartheid. It is argued that the government felt confident in taking the prenegotiation steps of 
releasing political prisoners and unbanning the anti-apartheid organisations in 1990 due to the 
reports back from Mells Park which indicated that the ANC leadership was reasonable and 
lacking in bitterness and the desire for revenge.270 
On 21 August 1989 the ANC, through the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) issued the 
Declaration of the OAU Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the question of South 
Africa. The declaration asserted that “a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, given a 
demonstrable readiness on the part of Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and 
seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations.”271 This Harare 
Declaration set the ANC’s negotiating agenda and was also aimed at preparing the rank and 
file of the ANC supporters for compromise once negotiations began. Through a better 
understanding of white concerns about the future under the ANC, the leadership had accepted 
the fact that compromises would need to be made in order to come to an agreement with the 
government that would allow them to move forward. As stated in the principles of the 
declarations “We would therefore encourage the people of South Africa, as part of their 
overall struggle, to get together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all 
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the measures that are necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy. We 
support the position held by the majority of the people of South Africa that these objectives 
and not the amendment or reform of the apartheid system, should be the aims of the 
negotiations.”272 In this statement, the ANC is saying that the end of apartheid is the main 
aim of negotiations but that the organisation would have to ‘agree to all measures that are 
necessary.’ One of these possible measures was that of an initial power sharing deal with the 
NP in order to create a smoother transition period.273 It was believed that this would curb 
white fears for the future of the country and not result in panic and a desire to leave the 
country. However, after years of minority rule, the idea of power sharing was not appealing 
to the black majority who had suffered under apartheid.  
The declaration outlined that the ANC was prepared to negotiate with the government but 
also stated its specific pre-negotiation conditions that needed to be met before negotiations 
could begin. These preconditions were based on ANC principles as well as what would help 
curb white fears and show that the ANC policies were structured and fair and not there to 
punish or condemn white South Africans for apartheid. An air of vengeance and retribution 
would not have helped the ANC gain significant white support and may have resulted in the 
NP trying to hold out for longer and not agree to negotiate due to fear among its voters. The 
ANC through the Harare Declaration stated that “together with the rest of the world, we 
believe that it is essential, before any negotiations take place, that the necessary climate for 
negotiations be created. The apartheid regime has the urgent responsibility to respond 
positively to this universally acclaimed demand and thus create this climate.”274 The ANC’s 
preconditions for formal negotiations were the unconditional release of all political prisoners 
and detainees, lift all ba s and restrictions on all anti-apartheid organisations and people, the 
removal all troops from black townships, the end of the state of emergency and repeal all 
legislation, such as, and including, the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe 
political activity and cease all political executions.275 The ANC demanded that these 
conditions be met by the state and were to precede any official negotiation process. 
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By understanding white fears and concerns, the ANC was able to take them into 
consideration and make an effort to quell them in their statements of principles without 
neglecting their core values and promises to its supporters. The ANC reiterated its 
commitment to a free and fair democracy and that in South Africa all its people shall enjoy 
common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, gender or creed. It 
also stated that all South Africans shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms 
and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched Bill of Rights. The ANC was thinking like a 
government which would have to accommodate the entire population and in order to do this it 
had to understand the needs of all communities within the population, including conservative 
white perceptions. This also extended to the private sector and the ANC was able to make 
decisions that would not alienate or chase away the big corporations which it would need to 
build the post-apartheid economy.  
The unofficial talks that members of the ANC leadership participated in improved the 
organisations position at the formal negotiation table after 1990 as they knew a lot about how 
the government thought and what was important to them. They also had received five years 
of experience, from 1985 to 1990, discussing the important, and sometimes contentious, 
issues with different adversarial groups which helped during the official negotiations. Mells 
Park had prepared them for arguing their point of views with an opposing group and had also 
given them important insight into the government’s psychological position.  
This chapter has explored the Mells Park talks, as well as the consequences the talks had on 
the official negotiation process, which were the opening of the door to direct contact between 
adversarial groups, building a sense of possibility within the ANC for a peaceful ends to 
apartheid, allowing for a greater understanding of white South African perceptions and 
allowing both sides to prepare for official peace talks. The following chapter will assess the 
ways in which both cases fit into the track-two diplomacy literature, making the conflict 
resolution process in South Africa a strong case for the abilities and benefits of unofficial 
negotiations.  
4.6) Mells Park Assessment 
 
This chapter has discussed at great length the major impact the talks held at Mells Park in 
England between the ANC and influential members of the Afrikaner community, had on the 











Page | 82  
 
up the door to direct contact between the struggle leaders and the South African government, 
built a sense of possibility that the South African conflict could be ended without further 
violence or civil war, allowed the ANC to develop an understanding of white perceptions and 
curb their fear of the future with the ANC in a leadership role, and allowed the ANC to begin 
mental preparations for official peace talks, and start developing policies to be implemented 
once in a leadership role. All these factors contributed greatly to the unbanning of the ANC, 
the abolishment of apartheid, the beginning of official peace talks and the democratic 
elections in 1994. However, what this thesis aims to do is explore the ways in which the role 
of the private sector specifically contributed to the success of track-two diplomacy processes 
in the South African transition. The Mells Park talks were spearheaded by Michael Young, 
whose efforts were funded by Consolidated Goldfields, although this was known by the 
participants only and not the company’s stakeholders. Gold Fields financed the travel 
expenses for the participants who had to get to England, gave the participants and Young the 
use of the company manor for the meetings, as well as paid for accommodation, food and 
drink for the weekends. The process therefore required a significant financial commitment 
from the company for three years of talks, although given the size and success of the 
company; this would not have been a financial drain by any means.  
What Gold Fields really brought to the table was its stature in the minds of the participants, a 
perception that if a company as large and respected as Gold Fields was getting involved, even 
in a surreptitious way, then the talks should and would be taken seriously by both parties. The 
ANC would have been pleased with the Gold Fields involvement, as like the Anglo meeting 
in 1985, it validated the organisation and showed that the ANC was being taken seriously by 
the international commu ity and that the private sector was finally taking notice of the plight 
of South Africa, both politically and economically, under the apartheid regime. Although 
Gold Fields is a British company and may have been viewed in a more negative light by 
Afrikaans South Africans, the Afrikaner participants were already open minded enough to 
attend a series of talks with the highly controversial ANC, identified by many white South 
African’s as a terrorist organisation. These men saw the benefits of opening a dialogue with 
the ANC despite the potential wrath from the NP government, and therefore the involvement 
of Michael Young and Gold Fields would have been viewed as a legitimising factor for the 
unofficial talks. Gold Fields could also be viewed as an interested, impartial third party, 
although it would have been obvious to both parties that it would be in the interest of the 
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economic conditions.  Young’s political experience in the United Kingdom also played a 
beneficial role in the success of the meetings as he was well equipped to understand the 
political issues and concerns of both parties and would have been able to assist in the forming 
of the agenda for the meetings.  
Gold Fields involvement in the Mells Park talks assisted in the success of the talks in that 
they provided deep pockets for funding and provided a level of legitimacy and provided a 
mediator in the form of Michael Young who had extensive political experience to inform his 
work at Mells Park. Had a different company taken the initiative to reach out to the ANC and 
elite Afrikaner South Africans, a company with less financial incentive to see the process 
succeed, less political connections to reach out and gain the cooperation and trust of the 
ANC, or without the resilience to risk backlash from the South African government, the 
process may not have succeeded as it did. Gold Fields position as an influential member of 
the private sector was instrumental in the success of the Mells Park talks and it’s the unique 
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Chapter Five: Assessment 
 
The desired outcomes of track-two diplomacy are ‘the emergence of a sense of possibility, 
belief that at least some elements on the other side are interested in a peaceful solution, 
greater awareness of the other’s perspective, initiation of mutually reassuring actions, a 
shared vision of a desirable future, exploration of ideas for the overall shape of a solution to 
the conflict, exploration of ideas for moving the negotiations forward and developing 
“cadres” with direct experience in communicating with the other side.’276 The success of 
unofficial negotiations in South African will therefore be judged according to these desired 
outcomes. 
This chapter will assess the ways in which the meeting between the ANC and the Anglo 
executives in Lusaka and the Mells Park talks in England meet the requirements of track-two 
initiatives discussed in chapter two. This assessment will be conducted in relation to who 
participated in the South African talks, under what circumstances the meetings took place, 
what the main aims and objectives of the talks were, the agenda set during the talks and the 
role of the third parties. The South African case study will be assessed on three levels – the 
ways in which the process and outcomes apply to track-two diplomacy theory, the 
contribution of the Anglo meeting and the Mells Park talks to the overall negotiation process 
in South Africa. 
When looking at the private sectors initiatives in South Africa’s conflict resolution it is 
apparent that two phases of track-two diplomacy occurred. Although each phase involved 
different participants and characteristics and produced a different immediate outcome, 
together they assisted in creating the environment in which the ANC and the South African 
government entered into official negotiations and eventually a peace agreement in 1994. The 
meeting between the Anglo executives and the ANC leadership in Lusaka can be viewed as 
phase one in South Africa’s track-two diplomacy process and was instrumental in 
legitimising the ANC in the eyes of the business community in South Africa. Gavin Relly of 
Anglo sought ‘to establish a relationship between the wealth-producing sector and the new 
African economic policy.’277 Anglo’s trip to Lusaka broke the seal and opened the 
international flood gates to the ANC in the mid 1980’s. The meeting with Anglo legitimised 
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the ANC both as the dominant political party of the anti-apartheid movement and as an ally to 
businessmen who were concerned of the economic future of South Africa. The meeting 
showed other businessmen, both nationally and internationally, that the ANC was not the 
adversary of the business community but rather the best hope for a peaceful and economically 
stable South Africa. This communication channel and support from the business community, 
started by the Anglo-ANC meeting, also enhanced the ANC’s negotiation option as this 
support but greater pressure on the Nationalist government to capitulate and solve the current 
economic crisis. In essence the Anglo meeting sparked off a chain of events that humanised 
the ANC in the eyes of many members of the South African white community and allowed 
others to follow suit and engage with the ANC without fear of repercussions from the South 
African government.  
Another important outcome of phase one was its influence on phase two, which began in 
1987 with the meeting of ANC leaders and Afrikaans academics in England. Gold Fields may 
not have chosen to cooperate with the ANC and responded to Oliver Tambo’s request to 
arrange contact with members of the Afrikaner community had Anglo not lifted the veil of 
secrecy surrounding the ANC leadership in 1985 and legitimised them in the eyes of the 
business community. The Anglo meeting laid the foundation for the Mells Park talks which 
in the end had a significant effect on the ANC and the South African government and the 
move to formal peace talks in 1990.  
5.1) Participants 
 
Track-two diplomacy theory requires that participants be from adversarial groups278 as this is 
the only way that progress can be made in a conflict, with both sides engaging with each 
other, even on unofficial grounds. At the meeting in Zambia between the ANC and members 
of the Anglo American Corporation in 1985, these two groups were historically adversaries. 
Anglo had been involved in both gold and diamond mining in South Africa since its 
inception. It was the viewed by black South Africa as the epitome of the capitalism which 
had supported and nurtured the racist apartheid policies in South Africa for decades and 
Anglo had become the face of corporate greed which the ANC with its aims of a fair and 
equal society despised.279 However, it was identified at the Lusaka meeting that the members 
of the business community and the ANC were no longer on different sides and both were 
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looking for an end to apartheid, although possibly due to different motivations. At the talks 
held in England, it was Gold Fields which supplied the funding, the venue and the facilitation 
for the talks through Michael Young. In these meetings, the ANC was talking with members 
of the South African Afrikaner community, numerous members of which had actively 
supported and helped to maintain the apartheid policies for generations in order to solidify the 
National Party’s political power in South Africa.  
5.2) No official mandate 
 
According to studies my Daniel Lieberfeld, semi-official negotiations within a track-two 
initiative require that the participants are granted a mandate from the adversarial groups 
concerned to discuss issues and possible agreements regarding a conflict. The ANC-Anglo 
meeting was aimed at mutual learning and understanding between parties, not to come to any 
official agreement regarding the conflict. The businessmen were representatives of the 
company and interested and affected parties within the South African private sector. They in 
no way represented government and could not make any formal decisions regarding the 
ending of apartheid.  
At the Mells Park talks both party’s participants stated from the beginning that they were in 
no position to make any decisions or come to any agreement during the talks. Therefore, 
although many of the ANC delegates included members of the ANC’s leadership, such as 
Thabo Mbeki, Aziz Pahad and Jacob Zuma, they were not granted permission to negotiate on 
behalf of the organisation. Th  ANC delegates were in effect the mouth piece of the entire 
organisation, including its top leadership in Lusaka and its supporters on the ground.  The 
ANC was also not engaging in discussions with individuals from within the South African 
government but rather interested and connected individuals from the Afrikaner community. 
Although president Botha was aware that these secret meetings were being conducted in 
England and he had made no attempt to stop them and was even receiving report backs from 
Esterhuyse via the NIS, the delegation was in no way officially mandated to speak on behalf 
of the government or enter into or commit the government to any agreements regarding the 
conflict.  
These talks are therefore characterised as unofficial, aimed at opening up channels of 
communication and exploring the possibility of negotiations in the future and what would be 
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were the participants in a position to negotiate an end to apartheid. Lieberfeld also outlines 
that report backs to political leaders are a hallmark of track-two initiatives,280  which were 
occurring at the onset of the talks in England. The ANC delegates were reporting to the 
leadership in Lusaka about opinions and insights expressed by the white South Africans at 
Mells Park, as well as their perceptions of the ANC. Willie Esterhuyse, to the knowledge of 
the ANC delegates, was also reporting information concerning the meetings to the South 
African government and President Botha via Niel Barnard. In 1988 there was also a second 
line of communication to the presidency, via Wimpie de Klerk who was reporting to F.W de 
Klerk who became the leader of the NP in early 1988 and was inaugurated as president later 
in the year. These report backs in essence created an indirect channel of communication 
between the ANC leadership and Botha long before formal negotiations were seen as likely.  
Also beneficial to the track-two dialogues in Mells Parks was that there remained a core of 
participants from both sides, although new participants were brought in at different stages, 
such as Wimpie De Klerk. These core participants created a sense of continuity and the 
attendance of new participants at different stages, even just for one meeting, allowed issues to 
be discussed from different point of views and added depth to the discussions based on 
personal experience and knowledge of certain factors in the conflict.  
5.3) Secrecy 
 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, track-two diplomacy advocates that 
initiatives be conducted in secret or at least in confidentiality.281 During the late 1980’s both 
the ANC and the South African government were facing pressure from their supporters, 
members and constituents. The ANC was divided into moderates who advocated negotiations 
and a peaceful end to apartheid as opposed to leaders such as Chris Hani who were supporters 
of aggression as a way of forcing the government to capitulate and advocated further use of 
MK activities, some of which resulted in the death of civilians and brought both international 
and domestic condemnation. Due to the political unrest and economic pressure, the 
government was also facing pressure from conservatives and liberals within the government 
and the South African population. There were those who advocated change as a way of 
resolving the conflict and supported negotiations with the ANC. However, conservatives did 
not want to be seen to be giving in to ‘terrorism’ and supported harsh police action against 
protesters and further control of the masses through force.  
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Within the government, Botha only allowed a few members of the NIS and his most trusted 
advisors to know about the talks that were occurring in Mells Park. Botha did not want his 
conservative supporters to find out that he was indirectly sanctioning talks with the ANC as 
this could cause an internal rebellion and rifts within the government during a time that 
cooperation was key. The ANC also feared retribution from its supporters if the 
organisation’s leadership was seen to be cooperating with the private sector, viewed as 
collaborators with the apartheid government. Therefore, the meeting with Anglo was kept 
confidential. However, the Anglo participants did not maintain a level of secrecy. Leadership 
within the company, including Harry Oppenheimer, were aware of the 1985 meeting in 
Zambia, and President Botha also knew and did not attempt to stop the trip. On their return to 
South Africa, reports of the meeting were published in the media and went a long way to 
improving the ANC’s imagine within the South African private sector, as the Anglo 
participants spoke positively about their experience in Zambia.  
The Mells Park talks could also have been misconstrued by ANC supporters as the 
organisation capitulating to the government, which may have compromised the organisation.  
There were also reports of the Mells Park participants being threatened and followed on both 
sides and many feared for their safety, increasing the need for secrecy.  Unlike the Anglo 
delegation which reported back on the meetings with the ANC and even published the story 
in some of the domestic and international media, Gold Fields kept the activities at Mells Park 
a secret from its shareholders. This was firstly to protect the participants from domestic 
scrutiny; however, Rudolph Agnew, Gold Fields CEO was not sure how the shareholders 
would react to the company interfering in domestic politics, especially due to all the media 
attention and international condemnation. There were also many people who did not support 
the ANC’s aggression tactics and did not want the company to be seen cooperating with 
‘terrorists’. It was due to these internal conflicts that both the ANC and the government kept 
the meetings in Lusaka with the Anglo executives and the talks in Mells Park a secret from 
the South African population.  
5.4) Third Party Intervention 
 
Within the South African context, the mining companies of Anglo American and 
Consolidated Gold Field acted as the catalysts of track-two diplomacy initiatives in South 











Page | 89  
 
with the ANC and that the first consistent indirect line of communication was opened 
between the ANC and the government through the Mells Park talks.  
Both Michael Young from Gold Fields and Kenneth Kuanda, the Zambian president, played a 
role in not only arranging the meetings but attended them as well. However, neither were 
participants but rather played a conciliatory role in the process as both men did not have any 
leverage in the form of rewards or punishment for cooperation or a lack there of by the 
participants.282Kuanda and Young also had no direct influence over the outcome of the 
meetings, but rather acted as a bridge between the two sides and had the important role of 
assisting communication. At Mells Park, Young had the ability to steer away from 
discussions which were no longer constructive or introduce a new discussion which had not 
yet been looked at but both parties had identified as on the agenda for the talks. He acted as a 
conduit by which contact could be made and relationships formed for the greater good of 
South Africa. According to Daniel Lieberfeld, “the Gold Fields-sponsored meeting included 
substantial informal social interaction, with participants dining and drinking together. 
Informality and equal status between groups fostered interpersonal trust.”283 However, both 
groups of delegates were aware that this was their meeting and that Young’s main role during 
unofficial talks was arranging the meetings and facilitating productive discussion following a 
specific agenda set by all the participants concerned. 
According to Wedge’s model of third party intercession, Young’s facilitation at Mells Park 




Establish contact with 
each side as an 
interested outsider and 
initiate a dialogue 
process 
 
Michael Young of Gold Fields was originally 
approached by the leader of the ANC, Oliver 
Tambo, and asked to set up a channel of contact with 
Afrikaans South Africans. Young approached 
prominent Afrikaner academics from Stellenbosch 
University who agreed to travel to England and meet 
with the ANC delegation and participate in 
discussions about South Africa’s reality and 
apartheid. None of them held any official role within 
                                                
282Fisher, Interactive Conflict resolution, 164. 
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the government, although they were highly respected 




Each side’s interests 




Both sides outlined their interests as developing an 
open dialogue about the current South African issues 
and an understanding of how each side thinks. The 
aim was mutual learning and finding common 
ground. Both sides reiterated that they had no 
negotiating authority and that these were in essence 




The two sides are 






Gold Fields role in the Mells Park talks was mainly 
to provide logistical support, such as providing the 
venue at Mells Park, England, which was neutral 
ground for both sides. Gold Fields also sponsored 
the meetings by provided finances for meals and 
transport to and from the talks for both parties and it 
is estimated that this intervention cost Gold Fields 




Assistance provided to 





Young was present at the meetings and acted as a 
mediator, helping to coordinate the process of 
agenda formulation and intervene to move on from 
discussions that were no longer constructive, 
introduce a topic which had not yet been discussed 
or ask participants to elaborate on statements 
made.287 Young initially kept discussions vague in 
order to build a level of ease between participants.288 
This ease allowed for more difficult and emotive 
topics, such as the armed struggle, one man one vote 
and white fears to be discussed more rationally, 
although disagreements and heated debates did 
occur.  
Stage 5 Intercession ends once Numerous talks were held at Mells Park between 
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cooperative 
programmes have been 
established.  
 
1987 and 1990. New participants joined over the 
years, including Willem De Klerk, the brother of 
Botha’s successor, President F.W De Klerk. These 
talks ended in February 1990 at the point where De 
Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and the 
release of Nelson Mandela and numerous other 
political prisoners. The next step was the beginning 
of official negotiations between the state and the 




The aim of the track-two initiatives were to create a platform of common ground that would 
assist in eliminating prejudice and misconceptions and allow for a smoother formal 
negotiation process when the time came, if it came at all. Within conflict resolution it is 
acknowledged that improved communication and understanding is one of the first steps in de-
escalation and resolution.289 Track-two diplomacy, as opposed to official track-one 
diplomacy, does not expect to come to any official agreements or a negotiated settlement, but 
rather ‘seek to build a relationship of “working trust” among representatives of adversary 
groups and feed ideas and proposals into the political process.”290 
As Aziz Pahad of the ANC delegations stated, “you didn’t come to the starting table as “them 
and us,”291 as a mutual understanding had already been established before formal talks had 
even been agreed upon. Unofficial talks are therefore not conducted as an ends, but rather in 
the hope that they will facilitate and inform future official negotiations between leaders of 
rival groups. It is believed that unofficial talks contribute to the possibility of negotiations 
and a peaceful conflict resolution by establishing lines of communication between key 
decision makers, in South Africa’s case, between Botha and Tambo initially, and later 
Mandela and De Klerk, who participated in the formal negotiations from 1990 to 1994. The 
Mells Park talks also enabled the ANC and the government to agree on the preconditions for 
official talks which were on the ANC’s side, the unbanning of the ANC and other anti-
apartheid groups and the releasing of political prisoners. The ANC agreed that once these 
conditions were met, the organisation would abandon the armed struggle and enter into 
                                                
289Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution,121.  
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formal negotiations with the government.292 Information gathered from the Mells Park talks 
also had a significant impact on the Nationalist government’s strategy in the late 1980’s and 
its final decision to concede. Botha had hoped to exploit differences between the pre-
negotiation demands of the ANC in exile and Mandela, who the government was talking to in 
prison, thereby causing a rift between the ANC leadership.293 However, when it became clear 
that the ANC leadership was in complete agreement as to its preconditions and the way 
forward and that no divide could be found, the government was forced to abandon its final 
hope of avoiding formal negotiations and came to accept the inevitable talks with the ANC. 
Had Botha not received information from Mells Park, he may have come to this acceptance 
later with further negative implications for the country, including economic sanctions and 
disinvestment, violence and possibly even civil war. The talks were also beneficial as when 
De Klerk came into power he immediately had an indirect line of communication via his 
brother at Mells Park and had been receiving information for months before he was 
inaugurated. De Klerk was able to use the information in order to better understand the 
dynamic of the ANC and the possibility of negotiations as a viable option to the end of the 
conflict.  
Therefore, as a result of track-two diplomacy initiated and facilitated by Gold Fields, a 
critical juncture was reached in South Africa. A critical juncture is the point in a conflict 
where unofficial and official diplomacy meets and ‘insights and options generated in 
unofficial diplomacy are communicated to and considered by official diplomacy.294 Through 
the discussions at Mells Park the critical preconditions for negotiations were relayed to both 
sides of the conflict and the information gained from the talks was directly used to initiate 
strategies and weigh up options for a prenegotiation environment. Mells Park had provided 
valuable stepping stones to the negotiation table and met the requirements of track-two 
diplomacy through its participants, the lack of an official mandate on both sides, 
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Anthony Bloom, one of the influential Anglo businessmen who met with the ANC in Lusaka 
in 1985 stated that “the things which men have in common are God-made, whereas the things 
that divide men are man -made.” This is the main aim of unofficial track-two dialogues, as 
discussed in this thesis, to make conflicting parties realise that cooperation and a positive 
agreement is possible. Within the apartheid conflict in South Africa, this dissertation has 
argued that the track-two initiatives conducted by the private sector created an environment 
between 1985 and 1990 in which this realisation could be felt. Specifically through the efforts 
of Anglo American Corporation and Consolidated Gold Fields, both powerful and influential 
companies within the South African economy that in numerous ways had benefitted from the 
apartheid policies for many years, the ANC was brought into the fold of opposition politics 
and were given a forum with which they could verbalise their policies and aims for a 
democratic South Africa to not only the business community but to a large number of South 
African citizens and, indirectly, to the South African leadership through the Mells Park talks.  
Although no concrete decisions or agreements were made and the South African government 
did not play any official role, these talks and secret meetings facilitated the creation of an 
environment of mutual understanding and indirectly created a relationship between the ANC 
leaders and the apartheid government. The Anglo-ANC meeting paved the way to Lusaka and 
the ANC and legitimised the organisations standing as a political force, not just a rebel 
movement. The talks in England created an indirect link between the government and the 
ANC leadership which progressed to direct negotiations, at which point a relationship had 
already been built between adversaries. They also gave the ANC a sense of possibility that a 
settlement could be reached without further bloodshed and allowed the organisation to 
understand white perceptions and create policies to abate these fears and concerns while at 
the same time not alienating its base and ideals for racial equality. Importantly, the numerous 
talks at Mells Park were used as a curtain raiser for official negotiations and allowed the 
ANC to prepare for formal peace talks in the future, both from a policy and negotiating point 
of view. A prenegotiation landscape had been created in which preconceived notions and 
misunderstandings were rectified and through these efforts both the ANC and the Nationalist 
Party-led government came to an agreement to enter into official talks and in 1994 hold 
democratic elections in South Africa and move forward with a Government of National Unity 
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The role of track-two negotiations in South Africa, identified in this thesis through its 
participants, unofficial mandate, view of secrecy, third party intervention and objectives, can 
therefore not be ignored or understated and it is the conclusion of this paper that the value of 
these unofficial initiatives, evident in the South African context, should be acknowledged and 
pursued in the hope that they can be used in future conflicts and assist in the move towards 
peaceful settlements and more successful conflict resolutions.   
What is also important for this study is the specific contribution that the private sector had in 
the occurrence and success of the unofficial meetings. The motivations and economic 
position and stature of Consolidated Gold Fields and the Anglo American Corporation played 
an important role in the initiation and results of these meetings and had it not been these 
specific companies, or other organisations, many of the factors which resulted in the 
successes in Zambia, and at Mells Park, would not have been possible. The private sector is 
uniquely situation in politics due to its economic contribution and in South Africa this 
allowed Gold Fields and Anglo to make and act on decisions in a way in which other 
organisations could not. It is this understanding that can be added to the track-two diplomacy 
literature to inform further studies and unofficial negotiation endeavours in the future. It is 
this gap that this research has filled – to identify that history and motivations of the role 
players plays a unique and important part in the process and results of prenegotiation. Track 
two diplomacy is not just a process, it is prenegotiation politics and what is most important is 
not who is there but why they are there.  
Within the South African case, the why is deeply rooted in history and this dissertation has 
explored in depth the ways in which both Anglo and Gold Fields history in the South African 
economy influenced their decision to reach out and facilitate discussions with the ANC. The 
cost of disinvestment, as argued by Gavin Relly, was high for the large mining corporations 
such as Anglo and due to extensive investment in infrastructure, it was more economically 
prudent to stay in the country and wait for a political resolution. International pressure was 
also mounting, both economically and socially, and companies such as Anglo and Gold 
Fields were under pressure to show that they were part of the solution and not supporting the 
South African government and exacerbating the political issues with domestic financial 
support. Large, multinational companies do not become powerful without excessive 
forethought and planning for the future. Anglo and Gold Fields could sense that a change was 
coming and decided to play their hand and make a judgement call as to which side would 
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couldn’t last forever and these big corporations decided to support the ANC so as to protect 
their South African investments in the future.  It was business decision pure and simple, and 
based on the size and influence of the corporations involved, this decision was politically 
beneficial and placed South Africa on a trajectory towards official negotiations between the 
ANC and the Nationalist government and the eventual end of apartheid.  
The contribution that this case study can make to track-two and prenegotiation theory is the 
understanding that political negotiations and transitions do not happen in a political vacuum. 
Big business in the past and at present has a major influence on politics, such as government 
lobbying which occurs by powerful industries. Their economic power and influence is 
viewed by many in a negative light, even sparking movements such as Occupy Wall Street - a 
campaign against the influence of major banks and multinational corporations over the 
democratic process in the US. The experience in South Africa is an indication that big 
business can and should use its power and influence for good and the important role that they 
can play needs to be better understood and acknowledged, and when necessary harnessed and 
taken advantage of. Big corporations in South Africa during the apartheid years were in a 
unique position to influence the end of the apartheid regime and the South African case study 
is a testament to the important and unique role of back-channel negotiations and the positive 
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